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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
On 11 August 2003 Charles Taylor, then the president of Liberia, was transported to a 
safe haven in Nigeria. A ‘safe haven’ is a diplomatic arrangement aimed to give 
protection towards a leader in a country for the purpose of terminating a crisis.1 In an 
attempt to bring peace to Liberia, a safe haven for Taylor was offered by Nigeria’s 
president, Olusegun Obasanjo and supported by other states in West Africa. This 
invitation was also endorsed by the international community, primarily the United 
States (US) and African Union (AU).  
The reasons for this diplomatic arrangement date back to the Accra peace talks 
in June 2003 which were sponsored by the sub regional organization, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). At that time, the peace talks had 
reached a deadlock and the possibility of a complete breakdown of the peace process 
was high. Thus, it was within this context that the safe haven arrangement for Taylor 
was prepared as it was believed that his exit would break the deadlock and bring 
peace to Liberia. 
The literature about the Liberian conflict shows that the personal roles of West 
African states’ leaders were very much present in the making of this diplomatic 
arrangement.2 The decision to offer a safe haven to Taylor was not only a pragmatic 
solution to an emerging humanitarian crisis, it was also conducted and implemented 
in an ad hoc manner. In an attempt to explain this important event in West African 
diplomacy, I will look at both aspects of personal rule in African politics and the 
ideas about the distribution of power in the debate on regional security. I am thereby 
posing the question whether the involvement of West African leaders in the political 
process and the unipolarity of power in West African regional security may offer us 
insights into the political dimension of West African diplomacy. 
                                                 
1 The original term of safe haven is defined as “circumscribed areas where the displaced can seek protection 
and sustenance close to their homes, but not in them” (Posen, 1996:78). Here I employ the term of safe haven 
as a loosely-defined term, a diplomatic option and a political solution meant to give protection to the leader of a 
country for the purpose of terminating a crisis in the country in question. 
2 This literature is reviewed in Chapter IV. 
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I will start by offering an introduction to the Liberian crisis. Secondly, I will 
sketch out the fragments of the process of diplomacy in West Africa that would lead 
to Taylor’s exit. This requires a demarcation in time, and I shall therefore limit the 
thesis to the period of Taylor’s presidency from 1997 to 2003. Emphasis will be 
given to the most recent peace process in the Liberian conflict, namely the Accra 
Peace Process of June-August 2003. With regards to the methodology of this thesis, I 
have reviewed the chronological texts of the peace process on the Liberian conflict 
and tried to interpret them according to the theoretical framework that was 
established.  
Research Questions and Hypothesis  
The main purpose in the thesis is to explore the political dimension of the diplomacy 
that generated the safe haven option. Thus, the research questions which will guide 
the study are as follows: 
 
1. What were the factors behind the decision by West African heads of state and 
the international community in deciding that Charles Taylor’s exit was a 
necessary measure for ending the Liberian civil war?  
2. How was the diplomacy in West Africa conducted with regard to Taylor’s 
exit? 
3. What political factor(s) explain the character of diplomacy in West Africa 
towards the adoption of a ‘safe haven’ as a strategy of conflict settlement in 
Liberia? 
 
The starting point is that Taylor’s exit was necessary to end the conflict in Liberia. 
His departure was seen as the pre-requisite for transition and lasting peace. Second, 
the humanitarian rationale was a direct concern in the strategy which facilitated 
Taylor’s exit. It was the sense of urgency to avoid more loss in the Liberian conflict 
that justified employing this strategy (Bøås, 2005:55). Third, the main feature of the 
strategy to facilitate Taylor’s exit rests on its ad hoc nature (Grant-Thomas & Taw, 
1999:71) which bypassed the ECOWAS bureaucratic channels that had been 
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facilitating the peace process in Liberia. The ad hoc character of the diplomacy 
implied the flexibility and pragmatism of West African political practices. 
Nevertheless, it marked the importance of the personal rule in African politics. 
Fourth, the distribution of power in West Africa shaped the unilateral dimension in 
the safe haven arrangement in West African diplomacy.  
Introduction to the Liberian Conflict 
The literature about the Liberian conflict can be divided into three main parts. First, 
some literature focuses on the cause of the conflict. The cause of conflict in Liberia 
could be found in the patron-client relationship within the extreme version of neo-
patrimonial politics (Bøås, 2001:717). For decades, the legitimacy of the state of 
Liberia laid in a patronage-based system where the elite nurtured the support from its 
client by providing politico-economic benefits for them (Ellis, 1989:160).  
During the administration of Doe, the patronage-based system was maintained 
through the combination of violence and plunder (Ellis, 1989:157). During the Cold 
War, the government of Liberia counted on support from the US to provide resources. 
When Cold War ended, Liberia lost its strategic position to the US. Thereby, the 
privileges and supports lent during the period were no longer available. The state-
machinery of the neo-patrimonial state of Liberia ran out resource to maintain the 
system. When the system could no longer work, this led to the state collapse in 
Liberia. (Huband, 1998).  
The second aspect most of the literature produced is about the dimension of 
the external intervention in the Liberian conflict. In the light of the absence from the 
international community, ECOWAS organized a military intervention force, the 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG was seen as a new form of 
regional peacekeeping. It posed the prospect of serving as an effective conflict 
management framework in the post Cold War era (Francis et.al., 2005). With regards 
to the partnership between the UN and ECOWAS, the partnership will have to 
consider the complexity of the geopolitical environment in the region, namely the 
Anglophone-Francophone rivalries in West Africa (Adibe, 1997). 
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Ellis (1989) added another dimension to the ECOMOG deployment in Liberia. 
He argued that ECOMOG intervention internationalized the Liberian conflict without 
putting a stop to the war. The conflict created new economic party to the war itself. 
The Liberian conflict stimulated the growth of a regional economic based on plunder 
and operated by network of armed merchant or of warlords with commercial allies. 
Within the underground economy in the country, the conflict became a form of 
business and a way of life, rather than an instrument for furthering any coherent 
ideological or even ethnic interests (p.156) 
The third main concern of the literature touches upon the discussion of the 
post-conflict Liberia. Sawyer (2005) emphasized the importance of establishing a 
stable political order in Liberia in the aftermath of the collapse of governance and a 
horrendous period of pillaging and carnage. Sawyer’s argument was that the task 
could be accomplished only in the context of the new constitutional arrangements and 
the governing institutions that differed markedly from those of the past (p.199). It is a 
new way of establishing constitutional foundations for democratic governance where 
the rights of the Liberian citizens will be warranted. 
Safe Haven and Conflict Management  
In order to discuss on the focus of the thesis, it is necessary to locate a diplomatic 
arrangement such as the safe haven arrangement into the setting of the conflict 
management. The term ‘conflict management’ is used as a generic term to cover the 
whole gamut of positive conflict handling, but it particularly refers to efforts which 
attempt to resolve any violent conflict (Miall, et.al., 1999:21). The overall process of 
conflict management would draw upon systematic steps to: prevent the conflict; 
mitigate or alleviate violent conflict once it has broken out; find ways to end the 
conflict; and transform the conflict into a peaceful process of political and social 
change (Ibid. p.38). The pathway towards peace could also be formulated as follows: 
peacemaking, negotiation, agreement, implementation of the agreement, enforcement, 
the establishment of transitional government, election and post-conflict peace 
building at the end (see also Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 2002; Olonisakin, 2003; Miall, et.al., 
1999).  
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A more specific term within such conflict management is ‘conflict settlement.’ 
It is defined as “the reaching of an agreement between the parties which enables them 
to end an armed conflict” (Miall, et.al., 1999:21). Conflict settlement brings an end to 
the violent stage of conflict thus suggesting a finality. In practice, conflicts that have 
reached settlements are often reopened later (Ibid.).  
Miall, et.al. (Ibid.) implied that the conflict settlement could be conducted by 
any means, as long as such served the purpose of ending armed conflict. The 
stagnation of the peace negotiations in Liberia failed to produce any agreement, thus 
it could not end the armed conflict.3 As a result, one needed to create a breakthrough 
in the peace process in Liberia.  
What I tried to suggest in the thesis is that Taylor’s exit could be considered as 
a conflict settlement to end the Liberian conflict. The safe haven arrangement became 
the political solution to safeguard the peace process in Liberia (Hoffman, 2006:321). I 
claim that Taylor’s safe haven in Nigeria served as a conflict settlement in Liberia. It 
brought an end to the conflict. It was also a precondition needed by the conflicting 
factions in Liberia to continue further to the direction of peace. 
Theoretical Approach  
In this thesis, I have chosen to focus on the political dimension of the diplomacy in 
West Africa. Diplomacy is conducted by sovereign entities (Bull, 1977). The aspect 
that has come to my interest concerns the factors that influenced and shaped the 
conduct of diplomacy in the sub-region. As such, I would regard these factors as the 
political dimension to the diplomacy in West Africa. To this end I shall concentrate 
my discussion within the theoretical framework from Buzan’s People, States, and 
Fear (1991), as well as Buzan and Wæver’s work in Region and Power (2003) for the 
basic conceptualization on the regional security system. 
Security 
Security is traditionally defined in military terms, where threats are of a military 
character and emanate from other states. Buzan (1991:19) however, noted that it is 
                                                 
3 Discussion on the peace process in the second phase of the Liberian conflict will be elaborated on in the 
Chapter IV. 
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neither possible nor necessary for analytical purposes to find a generally agreed upon 
definition. In broad security studies, one has to face many levels in categorizing the 
objects of security analysis; whether the level is individual, national, regional, or 
international. Each of these levels must identify durable and significant features of the 
security problem. As such, the thesis will look at the security analysis at the regional 
level.  
Region 
In security terms, ‘region’ is a set of states which have been locked into geographical 
proximity with each other, with distinct and significant security relations (Buzan, 
1991: 188). This view is also asserted by Lake and Morgan (1997). Region is defined 
as patterns of relations and interactions within a geographic area. It consists of at least 
two and quite probably more actors and is generally located within close geographical 
distance (p.47). The pattern of relations or interactions of the actors exhibit a 
particular degree of regularity and intensity to the extent that a change at one point in 
the system will affect the other points (p.11). 
Regional Security Complex 
Buzan uses the term ‘regional security complex’ to label the resulting formations of 
states’ interaction in one particular geographical unit. Regional security complex is 
defined as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together 
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered 
apart from one another” (Buzan, 1991:190). The idea of security complexes is simply 
an analytical device that helps understand the regional security. In one geographical 
unit, military or security threats are most strongly felt when they are at close range 
(p.188). Buzan’s work offers a basic framework for the case analysis. However, it has 
certain limitations regarding its state-centric approach.  
This approach tends to view states as the rational, legalistic states. Buzan’ 
work also prevents him to understand the importance of personal roles in states such 
as the ones in West Africa. States in Africa could be seen as the patrimonial states. In 
such patrimonial states, the prevalence of a patronage network is an important feature 
(Médard, 1996). 
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With regards to the patronage network, Chabal and Daloz in Africa Works 
(1999) attempted to assess the international affairs in Africa. Their interpretation 
suggests that politics in Africa is not institutionalized, as one might expect in the 
notion of modern state formation. As a result of the ‘non-institutionalized’ in African 
states, political practices remain informal, thus patrimonial. However, they do take 
place within a skeleton of a modern state. Chabal and Daloz’s argument would help 
us explain the significance of personal rule in African politics. As will be elaborated 
on, their arguments provide the complementary concept to Buzan’s contribution on 
the regional security complex.  Such conception will be needed to explain the 
political dimension of West African diplomacy. Therefore we will adopt an eclectic 
approach to analyze the case, as will be presented in the chapter two. 
Methodology 
Social research, in simplest terms, involves a dialogue between ideas and evidence 
(Ragin, 1994:55). Ideas help social researchers make sense of evidence, and 
researchers use evidence to extend, revise and test ideas. The end result of this 
dialogue is a representation of social life—evidence that has been shaped and 
reshaped by ideas—which is presented along with the thinking that guided the 
construction of the representation.  
Design 
Ideas and evidence interact through analytical frames and images. A social science 
scientific representation thus can be seen as a product of the interaction between 
images and analytical frames. Much social research work focuses on debating, 
clarifying and using analytic frames to represent social life (Ragin, 1994:58). On the 
other hand, there are ‘images’ built up from evidence. To construct images, 
researchers synthesize evidence. They connect different parts or elements of the 
things they study in order to create an analytical frame based on some idea of how 
these parts are or could be related (Ibid.).  
In the design of the thesis I established the analytical frame as the political 
factors of the diplomacy. Hence it is built on the aspects of the personal rule and the 
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distribution of power. Meanwhile the images I seek to present here are the process of 
diplomacy that resulted in Taylor’s exit from Liberia. 
Choice of Case 
Cases can be selected either because they are unusual and significant, or because they 
are atypical or undistinguished (Ragin, 1994:85). In such cases, a single-case study is 
inquired. I consider the case of Taylor’s exit as significant because it is a conflict 
settlement that is induced by an ad hoc diplomatic arrangement. At the same time, 
pragmatism is not something atypical in Africa. Therefore this case is distinct 
because the forum where they conducted the diplomacy is assumed to be attended by 
a legalistic, rational state, thus institutionalized.4 The pragmatism in the process of 
diplomacy shows distinctive characteristics in the West African politics.5 The case of 
diplomacy in Taylor’s exit will be the evidence utilized to assess the political 
dimension of the West African diplomacy. We will content ourselves with trying to 
gain a deeper understanding of the case at hand than is currently available in the 
literature. 
Data Collection 
In order to explain the political factors in the diplomacy, I would ideally investigate 
what the actors’ rationales and intentions were. Since I have not had access to the 
main decision makers or diplomatic officers of ECOWAS, this conclusion will 
instead have to be drawn on the basis of deduction and theoretical assumptions. The 
optimal solution involving fieldwork in Ghana, Nigeria or Liberia was not financially 
feasible due to my situation as an international student. However, the best option for 
me to gather data was provided in March 2006 at the Nordic Africa Institute in 
Uppsala, Sweden, whose library collection is among the most comprehensive in the 
Nordic countries. The stay in Uppsala was therefore used to conduct archive studies 
of news and publications on process of diplomacy in the Liberian conflict. This 
archive enabled me to review the chronological events on the process of diplomacy 
that had been published in the database of the library. 
                                                 
4 The character of state in Africa will be elaborated on in the Chapter II. 
5 The personal rule in African politics will be elaborated on in the Chapter II. 
 8
The focus of the thesis is on the analysis of the actions of the inter-state 
relations in West Africa. The empirical sources needed for discussion are gathered 
mainly from secondary sources. To identify the political factors within the diplomacy 
facilitating Taylor’s exit I have chosen to interpret a chronological process within the 
Accra negotiation rounds. Regarding Taylor’s departure, it was important to get 
proper information about how the safe haven arrangement was made. 
Validity and Reliability 
Validity 
Validity refers to the measuring of what we think we are measuring (Keohane, 
et.al.1994:25). Definitional validity is an expression of how well the theoretical 
research question corresponds to the operational one. In other words: do the data one 
has collected tell one anything significant about the theoretical research question? 
(Roald, 2004:14-15). The way I have formulated my research questions is based on 
the necessity of grasping the context which took place during the period of the 
diplomacy in the Liberian conflict. Thus, it is necessary to formulate operational 
questions to represent the inquiries based on the analytical frame. In my case, this 
could not be represented by one single research question.  
Reliability  
Reliability means that applying the same procedure to the operations of the study—
for instance, the data collection procedures—can be repeated, producing the same 
measured results. Such reliable measures also produce the same results when applied 
by different researchers. This outcome depends on there being an explicit procedure 
that can be followed (Keohane et.al., 1994:25). Though I had but limited 
opportunities to obtain ECOWAS documents in the Accra peace process, this was 
mediated by my attempts to document the progress during the peace process from the 
news records from the Foreign Broadcast International Service (FBIS). 
 
Secondary Literature 
The analytic frames were built along the work of Buzan (1991), Buzan and Wæver 
(2003), Anda (2000) and Chabal and Daloz (1999). They provide theoretical 
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frameworks through which to shed the light on the argument concerning the 
diplomacy, the distribution of power and the personal rule, as applied in Liberia.  
The analysis of the thesis was begun by presenting the discussion on the 
history of Liberian conflict. My main sources are analytical works mostly from Ellis 
(2001), Bøås (2005), Gifford (1993), and Huband (1998). I refer to their work as my 
main secondary sources. They analyze and discuss different aspects in the Liberian 
civil war and since they focus on different perspective during the war, their work 
provides a conceptual framework and introduction to the study of my case.   
Using secondary sources involves some risks and dangers engendered. Using 
theories by others and investing them with one’s own interpretation can be 
problematic because there is always a chance of having misinterpreted the other 
person’s theory or opinion. Furthermore, we should not forget that secondary 
literature is also a interpretation of events, opinions, and statements. Thus, using it 
will in many cases imply an interpretation of an interpretation.  
Another issue of concern is about a risk of using biased resources. Many 
writers hold personal opinions about it, and whether intentionally or not, they may 
incorporate a political agenda into the writing. In a situation of such complexity, it is 
difficult to be completely free of prejudices and biases and it is impossible to avoid 
biased literature. And this is, for instance, the case of Liberia, where there has been a 
‘demonization’ of Charles Taylor as a warlord (Hyman, 2003:190-191). This has also 
contributed to the fact that some literature may overly portray Taylor as the epicenter 
of the problems. On the other hand, I believe that a larger structural explanation 
might be better employed in this case. To counter the possible problem, a variety of 
authors and experts could be referred to as relevant sources. I have also tried to use 
the works of both the Western and African scholars.  
 
News Record from the Foreign Broadcast International Service (FBIS) 
Other secondary sources I use include the collection of news excerpts from the 
Foreign Broadcast International Service (FBIS). It is a US government operation 
which translates the text of daily broadcasts, government statements and selected 
news stories from non-English sources around the world. FBIS’ news database 
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consists of various broadcasting stations, e.g. Paris Radio France Internationale and 
Paris Agence France-Presse (AFP), Dakar PANA, Accra Ghana Broadcasting 
Corporation Radio, Kaduna Radio Nigeria, or Lagos Vanguard. My sources from 
FBIS include details and transcripts based on daily publications, and were mainly 
during the period of 1999 up to 2003. 
The library at the Nordic Africa Institute is linked to the Biblioline—Africa-
Wide NiPAD database. The news reports from the FBIS were accessed through this 
database. In order to find the news reports for the process of diplomacy in the 
Liberian conflict, I performed the search by combining the following hits:  
During the publication year of 2003 
1. “ECOWAS Liberia and Charles Taylor”, resulting in 277 hits; 
2. “Olusegun Obasanjo and Charles Taylor”, resulting in 148 hits; 
3. “Liberia Peace Talk June 2003 and Participating Country”, resulting in 8 
hits; 
4. “Mohammed Ibn. Chambas and Liberia”, resulting in 58 hits;  
During the publication year of 2001-2002 
5. “Liberia and ECOWAS” resulted in 239 hits,  
During the publication year of 1999-2003 
6. “Peace talk and ECOWAS” resulted in 141 hits. 
 
However, by combining various keywords I hope to gain more documents from 
different points of view to complete the picture of the situation. With the different 
combination of keywords, some results did overlap. Despite the overlapping results 
of the news reports, the thorough integrated information I obtained from the major 
search of this news database is organized and presented in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
Since every slice of social life potentially offers an unlimited amount of 
evidence, researchers must be selective in their use of it (Ragin 1994:67). The 
problem of selecting evidence returns us to ideas and analytical frames. Sometimes 
the images social scientists construct from these pieces of evidence may not conform 
to the initial ideas and frames that defined the evidence as relevant in the first place. 
The need for selectivity introduces a problem. When a writer chooses a particular 
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point of view, he or she selects only the pieces of evidence that support that position 
for reporting (Ibid.). This has been the case in assessing the Biblioline—Africa-Wide 
NiPAD database. There is a risk that I have found only what seems to confirm my 
own hypothesis. I have therefore tried to search for material that disconfirms my 
initial assumptions. 
Regarding the reliability of the news excerpts, I have no guarantee of their 
authenticity apart from the reputation of the news agency. With regard to the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, it is a US government operation which translates all 
sorts of reports such as daily broadcasts and official statements from non-English 
sources around the world. There is always a possibility that the materials presented in 
this database are also used for intelligence material. However, one should keep in 
mind that these archives only present parts of the information that the service had 
been able to gather. Some parts of the diplomatic activities have probably gone 
unreported and hence not presented in the database. 
 
Reports 
I also made use of different reports from various humanitarian non-governmental 
organizations such as the International Crisis Group, Amnesty International, Human 
Right Watch, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, as well as the news database 
of the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) Africa English Service which 
is provided by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA). 
 
Interview 
As I had not had any personal experience or first-hand information about the Liberian 
conflict, I conducted an interview with Leif Søfting, former country director for the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) who was in Monrovia during the battles 
following the collapse of the Accra Peace Process in June 2003. NRC is a private 
foundation and one of the largest humanitarian organizations in Norway specializing 
in international activities for refuges and contributes towards the protection of 
displaced people. The information gave me an understanding of the urgency of the 
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situation in the aftermath of Taylor’s indictment, particularly on the humanitarian 
situation.  
Presentation of the Chapters 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter two will present a more thorough 
discussion of the theoretical concepts, namely the theory on diplomacy, the weak 
institutionalization of politics in Africa, and the regional security complex theory. 
Chapter three will provide a brief outline of the history of the Liberian conflict. The 
focus is on the absence of international attention during the early period of war, 
followed by ECOWAS’ intervention, and the period during Charles Taylor’s 
presidency. This chapter will provide a descriptive background that leads to the 
diplomacy in the peace process in Liberia. Chapter four will emphasize a series of the 
diplomatic initiatives in West Africa, particularly on the latest peace negotiation 
round in Accra, Ghana. Two points will be presented as the background to the 
decision concerning Taylor’s exit: the indictment of Taylor from the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone and the consequences following the indictment. These events would 
lead to the safe have arrangement. Chapter five will take us to the conceptualization 
of the theoretical framework in order to look at the political dimension in the West 
African diplomacy in the Liberian crisis. The attempt to explain the political 
dimension of the diplomacy will be provided by combining the elements of relations 
in the regional security complex and elements from the concept of weak 
institutionalization of politics in Africa. Finally, chapter six ends the thesis by 
presenting the conclusions and pointing to possible directions for future research 
projects. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The theoretical framework of the thesis is built around three main theories: the 
concept of ‘weak institutionalization of political practice’ by Chabal and Daloz 
(1999); the ‘characteristics of the West African diplomacy’ by Anda (2000); and the 
regional security complex theory by Buzan and Wæver (2003). As the focus of the 
thesis on the West African diplomacy, I will first present the general concept of 
diplomacy by Bull (1977). The general concept of diplomacy refers to ‘state’ as its 
main actor. With regards to the identification of the characteristics the Wesr African 
diplomacy, I shall continue by the concept of weak institutionalization of political 
practice in Africa to discuss the nature of the state and the politics in the region. 
Finally, the conceptualization of the characteristics of West African diplomacy will 
be utilized to discuss the regional security complex of West Africa. This theoretical 
framework will help us identify the political factors for the diplomatic arrangement 
that brought about Taylor’s orderly exit from Liberia. 
Diplomacy 
Bull (1977:75) refers to diplomacy as “the conduct of relations between states and 
other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful 
means.” This term is applied to the official relations not only of states but also of 
other political entities such as the international organizations (p.76). 
 According to Bull (p.77-78) diplomacy includes the formulation and execution 
of a state’s external policy, both by the bilateral or multilateral relations. Bull (1977) 
asserts that the conduct of diplomacy can be either ad hoc or institutionalized. They 
are institutionalized in the sense that they take place against the background of a 
permanent relationship among the parties involved, thus on the basis of well-
understood rules and conventions (p.78). Diplomacy can also be ad hoc when they 
are conducted beyond the permanent relationship, thus eluding the rules and 
convention embedded. 
 Diplomacy can also function in facilitating the communication between the 
heads of state and other entities in world politics. It aims to minimize the effects of 
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friction in international relations. (Ibid, p.81-82). The interaction and diplomatic 
approach being performed by the West African states is the empirical piece of 
evidence from which we could start off deeper discussions concerning the 
characteristics of political interactions in the region.  
The Weak Institutionalization of Political Practices in Africa  
The starting point in this conception lies in the argument that the state in Africa was 
never properly institutionalized as required in the Weberian sense of the modern state 
because it was never significantly emancipated from society (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: 
4).6 The African post-colonial state has failed to become differentiated from the 
society over which it rules. Thereby the African state cannot acquire the political 
status which would give its legitimacy and its proper institutionalization. As such, 
this fundamental concept of power in an African state is defined as “the 
informalization of politics.”  
By having a weakly institutionalized state, the systems where the public and 
private spheres operate become functionally vague. This is known as the patrimonial 
system. In the patrimonial model there is a lack of distinction between the civic and 
personal spheres (Ibid. p.5). Those who are in power could easily extract the profit 
through weak institutionalization of political practices (p.13). To illustrate, the 
criterion for selection in the recruitment of the state-salaried employment is based on 
kin, communal, or other types of loyalty to the ruling elites, rather than on the 
qualification or competence. In other words, the logic according to which state 
service operates is resolutely particularistic, personalized, thus informal (p.31).  
  The failure of emancipating the state from society has profoundly limited the 
scope of ‘good government’ in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the very weakness 
and inefficiency of the state has been profitable to the African political elites. The 
development of political machines and the consolidation of the clientelistic network 
within the formal political apparatus have been immensely advantageous. It has 
allowed the elites to respond to the demands for protection, assistance and aid from 
                                                 
6 According to Weberian approach, the modern state is the outcome of a process by which the realm of politics 
is gradually emancipated from society and constituted into increasingly autonomous political institutions. This 
process marked the end of patrimonialism, where the public and private sphere becomes functionally distinct. 
(See Chabal & Daloz, 1999: Chapter 1 for details). 
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the members of their constituency communities. In exchange, the elite will receive 
the recognition of the political prominence and social status as patron. The notion that 
politicians, bureaucrats or military chiefs should be the servants of the state simply 
does not make any sense. Their political obligations are, first and foremost, to the kin, 
their clients, their communities, their region, or even to their religion. 
 The ramification of the weak institutionalization of politics in Africa generates 
two consequences: First, the state in Africa is vacuous in that it rapidly disintegrated 
and fell prey to particularistic and factional struggle. Consequently, it failed to 
acquire either the legitimacy or the professional competence which are the hallmarks 
of the modern state (p.14). Second, the state in Africa is also ineffectual in that it has 
never been in the interest of the political elites in Africa to work for the proper 
institutionalization of the state apparatus. In other words, its usefulness is greatest 
when it is least institutionalized (Ibid.).  
 Deriving from the concept of weak institutionalization of political practices in 
Africa, there are two central elements that are coherently present: the personalization 
of power and the importance of vertical links among the elite. 
The Personalization of Power in Africa 
The politics in Africa is conducted in the framework of personal rule. It is a result of 
the lack of a clear cut and legitimate separation between the private and public 
domain. Consequently, this personalization of politics is being transformed into 
informal manner. Various levels of social identification and the loyalty which exist in 
African societies facilitate this informal manner (p.6).  
The African informal political order is a system grounded in a reciprocal type 
of interdependence between leaders, courtiers, and the populace. It is a system that 
works to maintain social bonds between those at the top and bottom of society (p.44). 
It is therefore necessary to develop a clientelistic framework where the elite could 
maintain its power through the support of their clients.  
The issue of legitimacy in Africa is firmly embedded in the patrimonial 
practices of patrons and their networks. The legitimacy of the African political elites 
derives from their ability to nourish the clientele on which their power rests. It is 
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therefore imperative for the elite to exploit the governmental resources to nourish and 
sustain their patrimonial system (p.15).  
As also pointed out by Bøås (1996:60), the most prominent characteristic of 
the African state is the lack of institutionalized constraints within its system. The lack 
of institutional constraints has made politics in Africa open to personal and factional 
struggle aimed at controlling the state apparatus. The consequence has been the lack 
of political stability. At times, political game is reduced to a fight between personal 
contenders for power 
The process of establishing a re-Africanization of the Western concept of state 
has led to reshaping of both political institutions and political actions by more 
informal and personalized African codes of practice (p.146). In most African 
countries; the state is no more than a pseudo-Western façade masking the reality of 
deeply personalized political relations (Chabal & Daloz, 1999:16). 
The Importance of Vertical Link among the Leaders  
The second t factor of African politics is the overriding importance of vertical links 
within the political system. This vertical links define the patrimonial system. Ideally, 
all patrons seek to constitute themselves as “Big Men”, or as the elite who are in 
power (Chabal & Daloz, 1999:15). What is significant in Africa is the extent to which 
vertical and personalized relations actually drive the logic of the political system. It is 
the ultimate ambitions of those who have power to establish their standing as “Big 
Men” However, such conception is subjective, and can only be achieved within a 
context of personalized relations. Within these relations, the clients or the dependents 
will ensure their recognition to the elite. Recognition as the primus inter pares among 
all Big Men, the superior among the superiors, is also highly desirable. This 
phenomenon is not exclusively confined to domestic politics. As shall be seen from 
further discussion in Chapter V, a concern over the hierarchical power arrangements 
in the regional level also does matter. 
By maintaining their control over power, the aim of the elite is not merely to 
gather power for their selves. It is much more fundamental to use that power to 
purchase the “affection” of their people (Chabal & Daloz, 1999:158). In this light, the 
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importance of survival is highlighted; albeit it lays more emphasis on the ruler’s 
survival rather than that of the state. Rulers seek to ensure their personal survival by 
seeking the survival and indeed strengthening of their state (Clapham, 2000: 4). The 
institution of the state is built as an arrangement through which the regime of 
personal rule is able to secure stability (Bøås, 1996:63). By taking this into 
consideration, it is argued that the foundations of political accountability in Africa 
rest on the particularistic links between “Big Men” or patrons and their constituent 
communities, either in the domestic or regional level.  
The Characteristics of West African Diplomacy 
Based on the discussion on the weak institutionalization of political practices in 
Africa, we now return to the concept of diplomacy. In the issues of political and 
diplomatic interactions in West Africa, Anda (2000:54) refers to the aspects of inter-
state relationships and the political network of the relations. He argues that the 
relationships between states may either be cooperative, competitive, or conflictive. 
Generally they reflect the power relations between states.  
Regarding the inter-state relations in West Africa, the availability of lean 
resources and the perception thereof play a fundamental role in the patterns of 
diplomatic distribution (Anda, 2000:121-126). As such, he formulated the 
characteristics of the West African diplomacy according to his study.  
First, the diplomatic communicative network within West Africa is fairly 
intensive. Despite its intensity, it is difficult to asses the decision making process of 
foreign policy since the political structure is highly centralized (p.125).  
Second, personalities played a significant role in African diplomacy. It 
consistently enhanced the central role of the leader as the formulator of foreign policy 
(p.126). This emphasis on the personal interaction and communication undoubtedly 
adds an individualistic angle to African foreign policies. Within the personalized 
nature of the African leadership, any established pattern of foreign policy decision 
may sometimes be easily upset by the leader’s idiosyncratic action (Ibid.).  
Third, the contention of foreign policy making in Africa is hindered by the 
absence of an experienced diplomatic corps and slim national budget. The defects are 
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somewhat compensated for by the frequent personal interactions between African 
leaders (p.126). Both formal and private visits to the neighboring states are common. 
Thus, the result of these visits is very much of policy coordination. This practice also 
signifies the importance of the presidential dominance over the foreign policy issues. 
 Fourth, the critical issues are often negotiated at the highest level of the 
decision making forum. It involves the summit diplomacy and is attended by the 
heads of state (p.126).  
From the characteristics of the West African diplomacy, the role of the leader 
could be concluded as the most important feature in the West African diplomacy. The 
diplomacy which is made through the visits among the heads of state may serve as a 
useful analytical barometer for assessing the political relations between states. Thus, 
these characteristics will be utilized to discuss the political interaction in West Africa. 
I will now turn to regional security complex theory by asserting that West Africa is a 
regional security complex. At the end, the assessment of the regional security 
complex will help us identify the political factors that shaped the West African 
diplomacy.  
The Regional Security Complex Theory 
The main concept in this theory is derived mainly from the work of Buzan and 
Wæver (2003) and Buzan (1991). Regional security complex (RSC) is defined as a 
set of states with a significant and distinctive network of security relations that ensure 
the members have a high level of interdependence regarding security. It is a “group of 
states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their 
national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 
1991:190). The central element in this theory is about the security relationship and 
the elements of interdependence in the region that concern security. 
 In security terms, the concept of a ‘region’ implies that some sort of distinct 
and significant security relations do exist among a set of states which are locked into 
geographical proximity with each other (Buzan, 1991: 188). In order to qualify as an 
RSC, a group of states must possess a relative intensity of security interdependence 
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and security concerns that establish them as a linked set in the region (Buzan & 
Wæver, 2003:48).  
Within this framework, West Africa can be defined in term of a regional 
security complex. The states in West Africa share the same border along the sub-
region, thereby share the same security concerns (Berman & Sams, 2000:77).  
Consequently, by viewing the close relationship between the civil war in Liberia and 
another security threats in the region, it clearly demonstrates that their national 
securities cannot be considered apart from one another (Bøås, 2000:144). 
 Buzan and Wæver (2003) argue the states in the region are dependent on the 
security practices against each other (Ibid.). This security interdependence is also 
strongly influenced by the power of the units or states in the region (p.46). Within the 
structure of anarchy, the essential structure and character of RSC are defined by two 
kinds of relations: the distribution of power and capabilities between the states within 
the regional subsystem and the patterns of amity and enmity among them (Buzan & 
Wæver, 2003:49).  
Power Relations in the Regional Security Complex 
Power relations in RSC operate through the concept of balance of power in a regional 
system. The concept of balance of power explains how power operates in the system. 
‘Balance of power’ refers to the general concept of one or more states’ power being 
used to balance another state or group of states. It could also refer to any ratio of 
power capabilities between states or alliances. This counterbalancing coalition occurs 
regularly and it maintains the stability of the international system, as well as the 
regional system (Goldstein, 2004:92).  
The most important characteristic of an international system is the distribution 
of power among states. In the anarchy of the international system, the most reliable 
brake on the power of one state is the power of other states. Power distribution as a 
theoretical concept can be applied to all units in the international system or in one 
particular regional system (Ibid, p.97).  
The distribution of power is operationalized into the term of polarity. Polarity 
refers to the number of independent power centers in the system: unipolarity as the 
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one power center in the system, bipolarity as the two power centers in the system, 
tripolarity as the three power centers in the system, or multipolarity with more than 
three power centers in the system (p.98).  
It is thus important for analysis within the framework of RSC theory to 
determine the power distribution in the regional system. The power distribution in the  
West African regional security is unipolar (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:239). As claimed 
by Buzan and Wæver, the West African RSC comprises a set of weak states. Most of 
which are also weak powers and dominated by a regional power that is also a weak 
state. Although the existence of a regional organization does not necessarily indicate 
the existence of the matching RSC, ECOWAS’s explicit move into military-political 
security field, seemed significant enough to justify West Africa as a regional security 
complex. 
However, the power relation in the regional security complex theory leads to 
second character of RSC: the pattern of amity and enmity. The pattern of amity and 
enmity comes as a consequence of the particular distribution of power in the region. 
The dimension of amity and enmity adds a clearer sense of the relational pattern and 
character of insecurity. It takes the firm form of interactions among the states, thus 
indicates the security relation in the region.  
Pattern of Amity and Enmity in the Regional Security System 
Within any given regional security complex, there exists a spectrum of relational 
possibilities which is described by the degree of amity and enmity. Thereby, these 
relational possibilities define the security interdependence (Buzan, 1991:218). Amity 
is suggested by Buzan as the relationships that range from genuine friendship to 
expectation of protection and support. And by enmity he meant the relationship 
defined by suspicion and fear (p.189-190). Between these two poles we have a broad 
band of indifference or neutrality, in which amity and enmity are either too weak to 
matter much. It can also be so inter-mixed that the overall pattern of amity and 
enmity is completely blurred. This could be mediated by the pattern of rivalry, 
competition, and alliance, which will operationalize the pattern of amity and enmity 
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003:45, 47). 
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The pattern of amity and enmity could arise not only from one single source 
such as the distribution of power within a given subsystem, but also from various sets 
of sources such as border disputes, interest in ethnically related populations, 
ideological alignments, or long standing historical links (Buzan, 1991:190). It could 
also arise from the contemporary security issues such as trans-border trade, patterns 
of investment, natural resources, crime, or smuggling of weapons and drugs (Bøås, 
2000:144). 
A high level of threat and fear that is felt mutually among two or more states 
may identify a security complex. Hence, the pattern of amity and enmity offer a more 
rigid perspective in seeing regional security rather than the aspect of balance of 
power. I will therefore utilize both elements of the regional security complex—the 
distribution of power and the pattern of amity and enmity—to provide an analytical 
framework for the political dimension of the diplomacy in the region in West Africa. 
Chapter Summary 
Diplomacy refers to the conduct of relations between states and other entities with 
standing in world politics such as the international organizations. By bringing the 
conception to the context of Africa, it is argued that the state in Africa is weakly 
institutionalized. The starting point in this conception lies in the argument that the 
state in Africa was never properly institutionalized. The lack of the institutional 
constraints enables the leaders to transform the state into their own particularistic and 
factions struggle. It reflects the informalization of politics in Africa. Thus, it is 
conducted within the personal rule. The accumulation of power is imperative as the 
fundamental concept of power for the leader. As such, the African state cannot 
acquire the political status which would give its legitimacy and its proper 
institutionalization. 
 The two central elements of the concept of the weak institutionalization of 
power in African politics are the personal rule in the personalization of power in 
Africa and the importance of vertical link among the leaders. Based on these two 
aspects, the interactions within the diplomacy in West Africa is marked by the highly 
personalized character, thus it will emphasize the presence of the leader or the head of 
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state. The safe haven arrangement for Taylor was also a result of the interactions and 
process of this kind. 
 The conception of a regional security complex helps us to transform the West 
African diplomacy into a conceptual unit. It is thus important to locate the West 
African diplomacy into the theoretical framework of the thesis. An insight into the 
political dimension of the West African diplomacy will be provided by looking 
through the elements of the distribution and the pattern of amity and enmity,. 
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III. HISTORY OF THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT 
 
The aim of this chapter is to give a brief overview of each phase during the fourteen 
years of conflict in Liberia. However, our concern is focused on three points: the 
establishment of the Liberian state which would lead to the first phase of the conflict 
in 1989; the involvement of the West African states in the Liberian conflict due to the 
absence of viable international intervention; and the period during Charles Taylor’s 
presidency that leads to the second phase of the conflict in 1999. 
The Establishment of the Republic of Liberia  
The state of Liberia grew out of a colony established between 1822 and 1861 by the 
American Colonization Society, which resettled freed slaves in the West African 
coastal areas from the United States.7 About 12.000 repatriates that came became 
known as the Americo-Liberians (Gifford, 1993). In 1847 they declared the Republic 
of Liberia. The American style of governance, with the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, was introduced in its constitution (p.10-11).  
The relationship between the repatriates and natives in the hinterland was 
never harmonious. The new political elite, the Americo-Liberian, always perceived 
the natives as enemies. As such, the construction of them as a common enemy was 
meant to consolidate the Americo Liberian’s group identity (Utas, 2003:96). The 
delineation of identity between the repatriates and the natives was therefore 
institutionalized. It distinguished the Americo-Liberians from the other ethnic groups 
in Liberia.  
In 1870, the True Whig Party (TWP) was established and shortly after that 
they came into power. From this point on, one party rule became the norm in Liberia. 
TWP represented the interests of the wealthy and powerful Americo-Liberians, and 
they monopolized the executive, legislative, and judicial posts (Tefft, 1992: 30). 
Despite the absence of an efficient bureaucratic administration, the TWP was able to 
achieve an almost totalitarian dominance of the society (Ellis, 1999:48).  
                                                 
7 The American Colonization Society was a philanthropist organization aimed at liberating slaves in the US and 
returning them to Africa. Many saw the scheme simply as a way for America to free itself of the problem of the 
black freedman, and those advocating abolition saw colonization as a prop for the institution of slavery 
(Gifford, 1993:9).  
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The political and administrative system in Liberia was built based on the 
system of the plantations practiced in the US. But, in Liberia, the freed slaves were 
the ‘masters’ and the indigenous people were the ‘slaves’ (Clapham, 1989:99). 
Reacting to this, the indigenous populations in the hinterland revolted on several 
occasions.  
There were two important elements in the construction of the Americo-
Liberian hegemony: the military force and the establishment of administrative 
boundaries (Bøås, 2005:77). The military means was one coercive way to isolate the 
indigenous population in places that had been assigned to them, also to repress their 
uprising attempts. On the other hand, the administrative boundaries were established 
in Liberian hinterland through a system of indirect rule. This system appointed and 
co-opted the local elite into part of the government service (Ellis, 1999:37). It 
pacified the local elites under the control of the government.  
Prior to the establishment of the administrative boundaries of the TWP state, 
the ethnic structure of Liberia had a flexible and inclusionary character (Bøås, 
2005:77). Administrative boundaries, however, strengthened differences between 
many ethnic groups of Liberia.8 Under this indirect rule, the hinterland was divided 
into sixteen tribal clusters. Each tribal chief was co-opted into the government 
system. The practice of cooptation marked the establishment of the patrimonial 
system in Liberia. The existing ethnic cleavages in Liberia were thus sharpened by 
the administrative boundaries. In this case, ethnic composition was socially 
constructed, in line with the political interests that were in place when it was applied. 
 Resulting from the characteristics of the administrative government, the nature 
of the state established by the TWP also gave a strong background to the future 
conflicts. By the early 1920s, the Americo-Liberian elite had secured a firm grip on 
the political and economic power in Liberia. As regarded by Chabal and Daloz 
(1999), it was motivated by the need of the elite to secure their positions through 
alliances with the other Liberian “big men”, such as high ranked officers, through 
clientelistic arrangements with the non-equals (p.15). A complex system of pyramidal 
                                                 
8 These are Baasa, Belle, Dey, Gbandi, Gio, Gola, Grebo, Kissi, Kpelle, Krahn, Kru, Lorma, Mandingo, Mano, 
Mende, and Vai; each of which was placed under the supervision of a paramount chief (Bøås, 2005: 75). 
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patron-client relationship throughout Liberian society, with the Americo-Liberians at 
the top, maintained the political rule in Liberia. Most of the reigns in Liberia were 
built on the combination of the personal power and the preemptive strikes against the 
enemies (Bøås, 2005:78; Brown, 2003: 221).  
The stable neopatrimonial system in Liberia lasted until 1970, as it had the 
available resources necessary to maintain the system. The neopatrimonial system 
maintained a stable social structure that ensured that the Americo-Liberians remained 
in power. The indigenous population was the group that suffered the most under this 
system. They were completely marginalized both politically and economically (Bøås, 
2005:78).   
Starting from the presidency of William Tolbert (1971-1980), the patrimonial 
state of Liberia started to face hardship. Tolbert did not show the same ability and 
willingness of his predecessors to use coercion and patronage to maintain the 
neopatrimonial state. At the same time there was another severe challenge: the 
resource needed to nourish the patronage network almost run out (Ibid.). From this 
point on, Liberia started to face great economic problems.  
As a solution to the economic problems, the government promptly initiated an 
unpopular policy by raising the prices of basic needs, including rice (Brown, 
2003:220). With most of the population living under poverty line, a serious riot 
followed by widespread looting occurred in Monrovia on the 14 April 1979 (Ellis, 
1999:50). A state of emergency was declared and as commonly occurred, the riots 
were put down with force. The government arrested most leaders of the small and 
fragmented opposition groups with the accusation of plotting a coup against the 
government. However, only two days before their cases were due to appear in the 
court, a military coup in April 1980 overthrew the government. Tolbert was killed in 
the coup, and this event marked the end of the Americo-Liberian’s era in Liberia.  
Samuel Doe’s Presidency and the Domination of the Indigenous 
The 12 April 1980 coup brought Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, a low-ranked military 
officer of Krahn origin, to power in Liberia. Initially the coup was well received 
among ordinary Liberians. Having assumed power, the coup perpetrators suspended 
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the constitution, banned political parties, and released political prisoners. The 
People’s Redemption Council (PRC) was established as the new government under 
Doe’s chairmanship (See Ellis, 1999: 54-65 for Doe’s early period of presidency).  
However, it did not take long before the new government was captured by the 
logic of the neopatrimonial state.9 The PRC developed a vehicle of enrichment for its 
members and the group to which they belonged. The fact that Doe was relatively 
unconnected politically forced him to use ethnic politicization and the manipulation 
of ethnic affiliations as means to consolidate his power (Hoffman, 2006:310). With 
regard to this, ethnicity became even more politicized and polarized.  
To achieve his goals, Doe rearranged the structure of ethnic group relations in 
Liberia. He centered and circulated his power among the Krahn group. In addition, he 
began to court Mandingo traders in the country. The Mandingos had never had a 
good reputation in Liberian society. The ethnic based circulation of power was the 
way to marginalize the other ethnic groups, the Gio and Mano, whose populist leader 
Thomas Qwiwonkpa, was seen as the biggest threat to Doe’s authority.10  
The brutal and authoritarian nature of Doe’s rule and the Cold War 
geopolitical considerations brought Doe’s regime to rely on support solely from the 
US government as the old time’s patron of Liberia (Ellis 1999, Chapter 1). Even the 
extremely corrupt election in 1985 was approved by the US government. An 
explanation for this could be found in the context of Cold War, during which the US 
gave full support for any government that became the US’s ally (see Hyman, 2003; 
Huband, 1998; Levitt, 2005). 
The fraudulent 1985 election caused a great political instability in Liberia. 
Coup attempts and uprisings against Doe’s government were put down by violence 
and repression. These political troubles came at a time when Liberia faced a severe 
                                                 
9 Despite its mask of democratic governance, the realities of the Liberian state came closely to resemble the 
familiar American model of the highly centralized and authoritarian one-party state or “patrimonial regime.” 
Power was concentrated in the personal rule of the president, exercised through state-controlled patronage 
networks, and maintained through the use of repressive force, with the one party system serving as its 
supporting legislative arms (Brown, 2003). The similar logic was repeated by Doe during his presidency. 
10 Qwiwonkpa used to be one of Doe’s companions in the 1980 coup against Tolbert. He had been a popular 
figure among the population, as he lived a low-profile life, rather than adopting the luxury of power. 
Qwiwonkpa also showed constant objection towards corruption and insisted on immediate return to the civilian 
rule. Later, he became a strong opponent of Doe (Gifford, 1993:23). 
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economic hardship (Levitt, 2005). This situation led to the eruption of the conflict.11 
During Doe’s last five years in power, corruption, grand theft of state resources, 
murder, rape, and other human rights abuses were not uncommon (Bøås, 2005). 
Doe’s administration had tried to recreate the glamour of Americo-Liberian era by 
centralizing the power on their own group and accumulating wealth within it (Bøås, 
2005:78). It proved to be unsuccessful and they ended up maintaining control in the 
country by no other means than force.  
The First Phase of the Liberian Conflict: NPFL’s Incursion 
The outbreak of the conflict was on 24 December 1989, when a small rebel army self-
claimed as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), entered the Liberian border 
from Cotê d’Ivoire. The NPFL was under the leadership of Charles Taylor.12 Having 
crossed the Ivorian border, they established a military base in Nimba County. In the 
beginning, the insurgents were underestimated and considered to be a minor armed 
movement. However, only within half a year, the NPFL had already controlled 90 
percent of the whole country except Monrovia (Bøås, 2001:709; Utas, 2003:10; 
Levitt, 2005:206).  
Doe ordered his Krahn-dominated army to attack villages in Nimba county, 
knowing that the manpower and the support for Taylor mainly came from the Gio and 
Mano populations who were concentrated there. In retaliation, Taylor ordered the 
NPFL troops to target the Krahns and Mandingos in their attacks (Ellis, 1999; 
Huband, 1998; Bøås, 2001). Essentially, the conflict was a result of the resentment 
against the Krahns and Mandingos, the ethnic groups favored by Doe (Huband, 
2001). It escalated open fighting, heading towards Monrovia as the final target.  
During the summer of 1990, there was a major split within the NPFL, mainly 
due to the internal distribution of power (Utas, 2003:10). Prince Yeduo Johnson 
formed the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) and left Taylor. 
                                                 
11 In November 1985, Qwiwonkpa launched a coup attempt due the fraud of the election in which he 
participated in and was later dismissed by Doe. The failed coup led to Qwiwonkpa’s execution and retaliating 
violence towards the ethnic group of Qwiwonkpa, the Gio and another close ally, Mano, in the Nimba county 
(Gifford, 1993:23 ). 
12 The NPFL was the movement originally founded by Qwiwonkpa in opposition to Doe. It was later revived 
by survivors of Qwiwonkpa’s 1985 coup attempt. The revived NPFL was originally a collection of exiles who 
had little in common other than their hatred of Doe and his government. Taylor emerged as the group’s leader 
only because he was the one with the best foreign contacts (Ellis, 1989:158). 
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After the split, Johnson and Taylor’s armies fought each other. Nevertheless both 
soon trapped Doe and his remaining Krahn fighters in Monrovia. By August 1990, 
Liberia had descended into anarchy and violence became an everyday occurrence on 
the streets of Monrovia.  
ECOWAS Intervention as a Regional Response 
At the height of the war, Doe had not only lost de facto control of the state to 
Taylor’s NPFL, but also his regional and international legitimacy. The deterioration 
of security situation in Liberia was a crucial concern for some of the neighboring 
countries in West Africa. 
As addressed to the UN Security Council in 1990, the possible spill-over of the 
conflict into neighboring countries and the massive number of refugees fleeing the 
country became the primary concern of the neighboring countries in West Africa 
(Jaye, 2003:234). Conflicts generally have a significant regional repercussion because 
instability in one country has the potential to generate spill over and demonstration 
effects in nearby countries (Ibid.). At that point the UN was invited to join the 
mediation effort in Liberia. However attempts to place the Liberian crisis before the 
Security Council’s agenda failed. In part because of the opposition from Côte 
d’Ivoire, and because the Council’s members shared the US view that the problem 
should be solved by Africans (Adibe, 1997:471).  
A reason behind the US reluctance to intervene was the its preoccupation with 
changes in the international system caused by rapid political changes in the former 
Soviet bloc. At the same time the US was also occupied by its intervention following 
the Iraq’s invasion to Kuwait (Ellis, 1989:156). Consequently, the US soon began 
consultation with its African allies with a view of orchestrating a regional response 
(Adibe, 1997). However, the dynamics of the war changed quite sharply by the end of 
the spring of 1990. A series of massacres started to target foreign nationals in Liberia, 
by government and rebels forces alike. The US responded by deploying forces merely 
to evacuate US citizens and privileged foreigners residing in Liberia (Adibe, 1997).  
Plea for help was also addressed to the African Union (Adibe, 1997:472). Not 
surprisingly, the AU resorted to its article of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
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member-nations. However, the new OAU leadership, comprised of President Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda as the chairman and former Tanzanian foreign minister, Salim 
Ahmed Salim as the Secretary General, viewed that the norm of non-intervention did 
not apply to the Liberian conflict. Later, they approached Nigeria, the dominant West 
African state, to lead regional force into Liberia within the framework of ECOWAS 
(Ibid.).  
The combination of the absence of international community and the 
encouragement from the AU, made the Nigeria’s military ruler, General Ibrahim 
Babangida, to take the lead in mediating the Liberian conflict. He seized the 
opportunity not only to exercise the statesmanship, but also to divert national and 
international attention away from mounting socio-economic problems and political 
abuses at home.  
During the ECOWAS summit in Banjul, May 1990, Babangida urged the other 
heads of state in the ECOWAS ‘to bring the Liberian crisis to a speedy and peaceful 
end.’ The call generated the ‘ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia’ with immediate 
emphasis on military means (Adibe, 1997:473).13 However, diplomatic approach was 
not a priority in this peace plan. The course of ECOWAS’ reluctance towards means 
of diplomacy was due to the organization’s lack of experience in the diplomacy of 
multilateral security (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the heavy economic toll of the refugee and 
humanitarian situation on Liberia’s neighbors made the rapid intervention by 
ECOWAS an imperative (Ibid.). Promptly opting for military means, on 7 August 
1990 the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established under 
the leadership of Nigeria as a regional peacekeeping force (See Alao, 1998: 62-65; 
Olonisakin, 2003; Aboagye, 2004). 
Most of the initial force came from the Anglophone states. Nigeria and Ghana 
supplied the largest contingents, joined by the Gambia and Sierra Leone (Grant-
Thomas & Taw, 1999:60). Guinea, which sustained the largest influx of Liberian 
refugees, was the only francophone state that contributed troops to ECOMOG 
                                                 
13 The results of the Peace Plan were: immediate cessation of hostilities by all factions; the formation and 
immediate deployment of ECOMOG to Liberia; generalized disarmament of the warring parties by ECOMOG; 
an embargo on the importation and acquisition of arms by the warring parties in Liberia; the formation of an 
Interim Government of National Unity pending the conduct of general and presidential elections in Liberia (See 
ECOWAS, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90 in Adibe, 1997). 
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(Mortimer, 1996:294). In what may be perceived as the continuation of the regional 
rivalry, the Francophone states objected ECOWAS intervention. Burkina Faso and 
Cotê d’Ivoire clearly declared its opposition to ECOWAS intervention. On the 
contrary, Senegal expressed its reservation towards ECOWAS intervention by 
referring to Nigeria’s lack of consultation in the decision making process.  
 ECOMOG’s entry into Liberia was largely ineffective due to the poor 
planning, the lack of adequate equipment, and the basic intelligence information 
(Alao, 1998:64-65). ECOWAS’ official mandate was to impose ceasefire and help to 
form an interim government that could hold elections within twelve months. 
However, in unofficial manner, the mandate was rendered much simpler: to keep 
Taylor away from any legitimate form of power (Bøås, 2005:81).  
Nevertheless, another event occurred. On the 9 September 1990 Doe was 
abducted by Prince Johnson and his INPFL while making his way to the ECOWAS 
headquarter in Monrovia. Once in Johnson’s custody, Doe was shot, beaten, viciously 
mutilated, and murdered. His death was actually being taped and the video turned out 
to be the best-selling VHS in West Africa (Ellis, 1999; Huband, 1998). 
Subsequent to this situation, neither Taylor nor Johnson had the military 
resources to gain control over Monrovia. Although ECOMOG could prevent Taylor 
and Johnson from controlling the city, they also had insufficient military resources to 
defeat the rebels. Forced with this situation, ECOMOG decided to cooperate with the 
newly emerging factions in fighting Taylor’s force (Bøås, 2005, p.81). From this 
point on, ECOWAS was no longer neutral in the Liberian conflict. 
The new factions that fought alongside with ECOMOG were mainly formed 
on the basis of ethnicity (Bøås, 2005:82). The Krahn and the Mandingo, Doe’s 
ethnical ally groups, formed the United Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
(ULIMO). Their only shared goal was to keep Taylor away from power, thus it made 
them the counterparts for ECOMOG. However, this goal was not strong enough to 
make a sustainable political alliance. It resulted in an open conflict between the two 
groups. In 1995 ULIMO split into two factions: ULIMO-J (the Krahn faction) and 
ULIMO-K (the Mandingo faction). In the latter stage of the conflict, the ULIMO-K 
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would evolve into LURD, and the ULIMO-J would develop into MODEL (Bøås, 
2005; Utas, 2003). 
The period from 1990 to 1997 in Liberia was basically a period of massive 
human rights violations and failed attempts to bring the parties to agreement for peace 
and reconciliation. The inability of the warring parties to find common ground for 
peace eventually led to the breakdown of thirteen peace talks (Adibe, 1997:473).  
Charles Taylor’s Presidency 
The failed attempts to implement peace agreements in Liberia were mostly due to the 
inability of Nigeria to accept any deals which included Taylor (Bøås, 2005:83). 
However, Taylor and Nigerian leader, Sani Abacha reached an agreement in 1996 
(Ellis, 2001:4; Francis, et.al. 2005: 128). There were two reasons for doing this 
agreement: first, because Taylor’s NPFL was militarily weakened and second, 
because Abacha wanted to break out from the international isolation due to his status 
as the undemocratic military dictator in Nigeria (Bøås, 2005:83). Other analysts 
believed that Nigeria was becoming weary of the prolonged intervention in Liberia, 
and was seeking an exit strategy (Francis, et.al, 2005). If Nigeria emerged as the 
peacemaker in Liberia, it would send a strong signal to the international community 
that Nigeria could not be ignored. It was a tactical cooperation between Abacha and 
Taylor that they determined on letting a democratic election decided who would 
govern Liberia in the forthcoming years (Bøås, 2005).  
Based on this agreement, the fourteenth peace accord led to an election on 19 
July 1997. It was held under the supervision of international observers. The result 
brought about Taylor’s party, the National Patriotic Party (NPP) in defeating the 
other 12 parties at the polls by more than 70 percent vote. The NPP received 75.3 
percent of the vote, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (who later would be elected as Liberian 
president in the 2005 election) received only 9 percent, while Alhaji Kromah, the 
leader of the ULIMO-K (the predecessor to LURD) only received about four percent 
(Levitt, 2005:210).  
The little share of votes that the other election candidates gained was 
interlinked with the long historical construction of Liberia. There had always been 
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suspicion that ULIMO was actually the political project of the Mandingo. Meanwhile 
Johnson Sirleaf, the Harvard graduate who was the preferred candidate of the 
international community was seen as the continuation of the old Americo-Liberian 
regime. Voter turnout was overwhelming; over 600.000 of the 700.000 registered 
voters participated in the election. The NPP won 21 out of the 26 Senate seats and 49 
of the 64 House of Representatives seats (Levitt, 2005). 
Taylor’s victory could not simply be attributed to the fact that he had enough 
weapons and soldiers to continue the war if he lost. More important was the fact that 
Taylor’s movement was the most ethnically diverse of all Liberian factions. His 
support came from the broader spectrum than any of the other armed factions (Bøås, 
2005:83). Taylor’s victory might also be explained by “a heady brew of electoral 
rules and irregularities, a huge campaign, a backbone of support, a divide and weak 
opposition, and his apparent dominance of the security question” (Harris, 1999:451-
452). After all, the 1997 election was certified as a fair election. In what was seen as a 
largely conciliatory gesture, some government posts went to the members of the 
opposition parties (Levitt, 2005:211). 
In the aftermath of the 1997 election, the situation in Liberia was mainly 
stable. It was due to Taylor’s coercive manner in maintaining order in Liberia, which 
was similar to his predecessors. Taylor was interested in personal wealth and power, 
and he too was soon captured by the patrimonial machine of the politics in Liberia. 
The state apparatus were used as the extension of his own personal power. This in 
turn created potential conditions for the breakdown of law and order. Taylor repeated 
the same path and fatal mistake of his predecessors by filling the army with ethnic 
loyalist, and using them as a tool against his political opponents. The 
institutionalization of violence as the mean to maintain his power was highly 
exercised throughout Taylor’s regime. For most of the leaders in Liberia, the capacity 
to exercise violence was the foundation for their political power (Hoffman, 
2006:314). Violence became the legitimate claim towards Taylor’s authority and 
power (p.315).  
This pseudo-stability however, did not last long. Only within two years after 
Taylor assumed the presidency, Liberia returned to a situation of widespread 
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insecurity, weak economy, the collapse of public infrastructure, patronage-fuelled 
corruption, interethnic clashes, and false coup plots. As a result of the declining 
security situation, particularly in Monrovia, Taylor lost his popularity. Reshuffling of 
Taylor’s cabinet ministers also became common. Even a string of extrajudicial 
killings became one of many ways in which Taylor sought to thwart any challenges to 
his authority. The absence of the rule of law marked the daily affairs in Liberia, and 
all of these led to the tense political climate in Liberia.  
 The tension also emerged between Taylor and ECOMOG concerning issue of 
disarmament and security sector reform. In contrary to the ECOMOG’s mandate, 
Taylor’s government did not completely cooperate with ECOMOG in demobilizing 
approximately 35.000 former combatants. Instead, many of them were rearmed and 
reintegrated into the Armed Forces of Liberia (Levitt, 2005: 212). These forces 
preyed the civilian population and contributed to the wave of violence throughout the 
country. 
Taylor also faced a strong pressure from the international community. After 
the 1997 election the international community promised to contribute to the 
rebuilding of Liberia. Shortly, they showed dissatisfaction with the political 
developments in Liberia and disengaged from the country. The UN later implemented 
the economic sanctions to Liberia in 2000 and 2001. The sanction was imposed after 
there was an indication on Taylor’s involvement in the conflict in the neighboring 
Sierra Leone (Africa Confidential, 2000:6). Although this sanction weakened Taylor, 
the major sufferings were undergone by the civilian population in Liberia. 
During the period of Taylor’s presidency, his domestic opponents were 
disorganized and united only by their opposition to Taylor as an individual. Their sole 
agenda was to remove Taylor from power; rather through military approach than 
political. The UN sanctions that weakened Taylor on the other hand opened new 
opportunity for Taylor’s opponents. After the sanction was implemented, an armed 
group, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) initiated its 
first larger offensive operations in Lofa county, bordering Liberia and Guinea 
(International Crisis Group, 2003a: 3). Being concentrated in that district, it marked 
the second phase of the Liberian conflict.  
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The Second Phase of the War: the LURD & MODEL Insurgents  
LURD was established on a basis of the now-defunct Mandingo faction of ULIMO-
K. The early attacks in Lofa County were carried out by former members of ULIMO-
K, many of whom fled Liberia when Taylor was elected president (International 
Crisis Group, 2003a: 3; Africa Research Bulletin, 1999b:13605).  
At the same time, ECOMOG officially began its final withdrawal from Liberia 
in October 1999 since its mandate officially ended (Africa Research Bulletin, 
1999c:13729). By May 2001, the LURD had claimed firm control of Lofa County 
and prepared on heading south towards Monrovia. In response to LURD’s 
advancement into Monrovia, Taylor urged his former NPFL allies to take up arms 
against the LURD (Africa Research Bulletin, 2002a:14714). 
The Lofa County in the northwestern Liberia is located on the Guinean border 
and is home to many anti-Taylor Mandingos (Africa Research Bulletin, 
1999b:13605). The Mandingo had been targeted by Taylor’s forces because of its 
association with LURD (Ibid). However, the role of Guinea should be taken into 
consideration as the LURD established its base there. Mandingo is an important 
group in Guinea. Lansana Conte, the president of Guinea, was allegedly giving 
support for LURD. Conte himself belongs to an ethnic group that historically had 
been a close ally of Mandingo.  
In what may be seen as a retaliation for Taylor’s backing of a Guinean rebel 
group, in 2001 the Guinean government allegedly began supplying the LURD with 
arms and ammunition.14 This was the reason for the leadership of LURD gained 
support from the continuation of their struggle in Guinea. The connection between 
LURD and the Guinean leadership, although complicated, was mainly based on 
ethnicity (Bøås, 2005:85; Levitt, 2005:225). The crises in Liberia, Guinea, and in 
Sierra Leone contributed to the bigger armed conflict in the area in the Mano River 
areas. 
                                                 
14 Since early September 2000, Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, known as the Mano River Union nations, 
share mutual tension along its border areas and have been exchanging accusations of harboring or supporting 
dissidents destabilizing each other’s territory.  The accusations were addressed mainly to Taylor’s support for 
Revolutionary United Front, the main rebel group in Sierra Leone. Taylor was accused of fueling the conflict in 
Sierra Leone, while Guinea and Liberia have exchanged accusations and counter-accusations about cross-
border attacks from each other’s territory (See various news excerpts from Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, January-August 2001). 
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  The three leaders of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea were brought together 
by ECOWAS to peace talks. They agreed to work together to restore stability in the 
area, specifically by tightening their borders’ security (Africa Research Bulletin, 
2002b:14753). However, the exchange of agreements between the three heads of state 
and the various talks held within the framework of ECOWAS did not improve the 
security situation. No security progress was made in Liberia during May 2002, even 
though ECOWAS urged both the Liberian government and the rebels to accept an 
immediate cease fire (Africa Research Bulletin, 2002c:14861).  
As fighting continued, in April 2003, there was a confirmed statement on the 
existence of a new rebel group, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia, known as 
MODEL (IRIN, 28 April 2003). While the LURD was supported by the government 
of Guinea, MODEL was supported by Cotê d’Ivoire (International Crisis Group, 
2003a:3). The background of establishment of MODEL was relatively similar to 
LURD. Encouraged by the success of LURD, Krahn leaders exiled in Cotê d’Ivoire 
formed MODEL. Concerning this, the current Ivorian president, Laurent Gbagbo, 
was convinced that Taylor had helped rebels who operated in Cotê d’Ivoire. In order 
to retaliate, Gbagbo allowed MODEL to establish base along the border with Liberia 
(Bøås, 2005:85-86).  
The involvement of Taylor in Ivorian crisis was mostly indirect.15 It was 
conducted through his old links with Côte d’Ivoire and his relationship with Burkina 
Faso’s president, Blaise Compaoré. Taylor’s involvement intensified once the 
problems inside Liberia with LURD and MODEL gave him the reason to support the 
rebel movements in the western Côte d’Ivoire. The battles intensified, and the 
condition for the civilian population in Liberia got increasingly worse. 
Humanitarian Crisis in Liberia 
Since the end of 2001, the major armed confrontations along Lofa County led to the 
displacement of some 65.000 IDPs (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004:24). In 
addition, this outburst of violence resulted in new influx of Liberian refugees in the 
                                                 
15 The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire dominated the agenda of ECOWAS throughout the end of 2002 as the rebel 
group occupied the western part of the country. France, as the colonial patron promptly deployed its troops to 
monitor the ceasefire and protect foreign nationals. (See various news reports from Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, December 2002). 
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bordering Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Cotê d’Ivoire (Ibid.). In the beginning of 2002, 
fighting in the towns near the capital of Monrovia had caused the displacement of at 
least 20.000 persons (Ibid.). These numbers illustrated that the humanitarian crisis 
had reached the catastrophic levels. Due to the heavy fighting, humanitarian relief 
agencies were unable to access 70 percent of the country (Ibid.). This humanitarian 
situation became a major concern for the international community.  
The armed hostilities had worsened since January 2003 when LURD advanced 
towards the capital of Monrovia from the north. In addition, the emergence of 
MODEL from the east, along the Cotê d’Ivoire border, increased the number of 
Liberian civilians and refugees of other nationalities at risk. Taylor was forced to face 
a two-front battle far beyond his military capability (Bøås, 2005: 86). Monrovia was 
trapped between two armed groups and shelled with heavy artillery. The intensifying 
battles in Monrovia deteriorated the situation.  
The worsening condition for the civilian population became the background to 
the peace negotiation in Accra, Ghana. With government forces concentrated in 
Monrovia, and people escaping from LURD and MODEL’s attacks on the outskirts 
of Monrovia, the capital city was rendered the biggest IDP camp (Søfting 2006 
[Telephone interview]). The number of people sheltering in Monrovia exceeded the 
capacity of the facility itself.  
The numbers of civilian casualties were mounting. Most of the humanitarian 
workers had to cope with the situation and were forced to work with limited facilities. 
The main problem that they faced was mainly due to the lack of sanitation, clean 
water, and electricity. The next chapter will present how the deteriorating situation in 
Monrovia became the main consideration for the West African diplomatic community 
in its attempt to persuade the government of Liberia, LURD, and MODEL to 
negotiate.  
Chapter Summary 
From the brief outline of the history of Liberian conflict, we can see that there are 
certain key features that emerge. The element of the national sovereignty in Liberia 
was never resulted from the popular will. Rather it was the outcome of a heavy 
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exercise of power and violence from the government. At the end, it created an 
outbreak of conflict. The similar problem also arose during Taylor’s presidency. 
Taylor was trapped in the same state machinery as his predecessors. Unable to gain 
popular support from the population, the situation triggered the eruption of hostile 
armed conflict.  
The other key feature is the absence of viable international attention that 
forced West African states to sort things out in Liberia through ECOWAS.  In the 
initial phase, its involvement was complicated by poor military capabilities. The 
hostilities from some of the francophone states like Cotê d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso 
complicated the situation. The security concern over the threat emanating from 
Liberia engendered the involvement of West African states during the second phase 
of the conflict in 2003. Moreover, the deteriorating humanitarian situation became the 
main concern for the peace talks.  
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IV. DIPLOMACY IN THE ACCRA PEACE PROCESS 2003 
 
This chapter presents the diplomatic efforts by ECOWAS to find lasting peace in 
Liberia. The events during Taylor’s presidency may shed some light on the 
humanitarian emergency in Monrovia in 2003. ECOWAS’ diplomatic initiatives 
resulted in all major parties in Liberia would join the Accra peace talks. Giving an 
account of the practice of the diplomacy conducted in this period, I aim to pinpoint 
the condition that led to the safe haven arrangement for Charles Taylor. The notion of 
pragmatism as a prominent element of the West African diplomacy will also be 
discussed. 
The Path towards the Accra Peace Process 2003  
During the period of 2001, the endless tension engulfing the border shared by three 
Mano River states, namely Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, occupied the agenda of 
ECOWAS. The three countries had exchanged accusations and counter-accusations 
of the others harboring or supporting dissidents that destabilized their territories. 
Most of the efforts by ECOWAS on the Mano River crisis attempted to mediate the 
conflict were negotiated at the highest level by of the regional forum. The initial 
summit meeting on the Mano River crisis was sponsored by Obasanjo, the Nigerian 
president, and Alpha Konare, the Malian president who held the chairman of 
ECOWAS at the time (FBIS, 2001a).  
With regards to the broader scope of de-escalating tension in the Mano River 
area, ECOWAS tried primarily to engage the peace process in Liberia and encourage 
Taylor to participate in the peace negotiation with LURD. The efforts included: an 
ECOWAS mini-summit in Dakar, Senegal;16 the Rabat Process brokered by King 
Mohammed VI of Morroco;17 and the Abuja round in March 2002 (FBIS, 2002a).  
The following peace talk which was held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso on the 8-10 
                                                 
16 Despite some diplomatic prodding from the Malian president and chairman of ECOWAS, Konare, Taylor 
rejected the invitation and sent his foreign affairs minister instead (FBIS, 2001e). 
17 The three leaders of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea met in Rabat on 27 February 2002. They agreed to 
work together to promote peace, understanding and good neighborly relations, and to put in place a cooperation 
mechanism. This meeting was also ushered by ECOWAS (FBIS, 2002b). 
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July 2002 resulted in a significant outcome.18 Despite the absence of the government 
of Liberia, the talk called for establishment of an “international contact group on 
Liberia” (FBIS, 2002d).  
As a response to this recommendation, the UN sponsored the establishment of 
the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) on 17 September 2002 in New 
York. It was made up of the ECOWAS, the AU, the European Union, Ghana, 
Nigeria, France, the United States, Britain, the United Nations and Morocco.19  
The establishment of the ICGL represented the attention of international 
community and marked the success of the ECOWAS to seek support from them for 
the peace process in Liberia. In my view, the intense diplomacy was successful in 
gaining support from the international community in the peace process.  
The establishment of the ICGL showed a sensible international involvement in 
the peace process on Liberia. It also prompted the credibility of the peace process for 
the warring parties. Efforts by ECOWAS were also continuously conducted through 
various meetings and interactions among the heads of state in order to advocate peace 
negotiations. The initiatives at the presidential level were very much present at this 
point in order to formulate the strategy of ECOWAS in addressing the issue of 
Liberia. Further on, after the first ICGL visit in Mano River area,20 Charles Taylor 
and the Ivorian President, Laurent Gbagbo met on the 22 April 2003 (FBIS, 2003b). 
There was no official statement given concerning this meeting. However, the progress 
on their diplomatic relations implied that both heads of state were willing to 
cooperate. 
The compliance of Taylor to cooperate was believed to have relations with the 
economic sanction from the UN. As the sanctions caused more difficulties to Liberia, 
it prompted Taylor’s cooperation in the peace process. Hence, there was a hope that 
                                                 
18 The peace talk was sponsored by prominent Liberian politicians in exile, such as Amos Sawyer and Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf and attended by LURD, political parties, and civil organizations (FBIS, 2002c). The presence 
of Sawyer and Johnson Sirleaf as the prominent political leader of Liberia, in the Ouagadougou round, might 
encourage the involvement of the international community in finding solution to the crisis. 
19 The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Mohammed Ibn. Chambas then reported to and consulted the US 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner about progress in the peace process (FBIS, 2002c). At 
its first meeting in December 2002, the ICGL agreed to resolve the Liberian crisis through the promotion of 
internal dialogue among all the political groups, and good neighborliness among the three neighboring 
countries Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (FBIS, 2003a). 
20 On 14 April 2003, a team of ICGL Monday began a two-day visit to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone to 
prepare the ground for peace talks on Liberia. (FBIS, 2003a). 
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the cooperative behavior might help lifting the sanctions from Liberia.21 Meanwhile, 
Taylor also asked for help from the AU and other ECOWAS states, to back Liberia in 
the UN forum (FBIS, 2001c). ECOWAS, at the same time, made an effort to propose 
lifting the sanction by making an assessment report on the effects of sanctions on 
Liberia (FBIS, 2001d). This report was submitted to the UN General Assembly, and 
later passed on to the UN Security Council. 
At this point the diplomatic initiatives of the ECOWAS showed the 
cooperative behavior among its member states. Every state seemed to work together 
towards the improvement of the situation in Liberia. Efforts to bring peace in Liberia 
reached a final point when in April 2003 the warring parties in Liberia were 
convinced to be brought to the negotiation round. In this regard, the Malian President, 
Toumani Toure agreed to host the Liberian peace talks (FBIS, 2003a), and the former 
Nigerian leader, Abdulsalami  Abubakar was appointed by ECOWAS as mediator 
(FBIS, 2003c).  
On the 16 May 2003, after several exchanges of meetings, ECOWAS 
announced that peace talks between the Liberian government and two rebel groups 
would take place on 2 June 2003 in Accra, Ghana. The talks, to be held under the 
aegis of the ICGL, were expected to result in a comprehensive peace process (FBIS, 
2003e; Wrokpoh, 2003). 
This negotiation round was seen as a crucial and important chance to bring 
peace to Liberia since all major parties to the conflict were involved. Thus, it marked 
the success of the West African diplomatic community in orchestrating the peace 
talks. Preliminary talks with both groups were scheduled to be held in Sierra Leone 
prior to the Accra meeting. However, it was not as smoothly as expected because the 
delegates from MODEL failed to show up. Later it indicated its reluctance to 
compromise its demand, which was the resignation of Taylor (IRIN, 27 May 2003).  
Despite the objection from MODEL, the preliminary process continued. Later 
on, the date and the place of the negotiation round were changed. The date was 
                                                 
21 The new sanction against Liberia was come into force on 7 May 2001 and included a 12-month ban on 
imports of all rough diamonds originating from or passing through Liberia, restriction on air travel by its senior 
officials. It was given in continuation to the previous arms embargo and economic sanction enforced on 7 
March 2001 (IRIN, 30 June 2003).  
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changed to 4 June 2003, and the location was moved from Accra to Akosombo, a 
town which is 60 kilometer away from Accra, in the eastern region of the country. 
The likely reason to this change was presumably due to the security concern 
(Wrokpoh, 2003). Nevertheless the peace round was still known as the Accra peace 
talks.   
After the long process of regional efforts, the peace talk was commenced on 4 
June 2003. Due to the significance of this peace round a numbers of West African 
heads of state attended the meeting, as well as Thabo Mbeki, the president of South 
Africa and Joaquim Chissano, the president of Mozambique as the chairman of the 
AU (FBIS, 2003f). The expectation to this round was high. Furthermore, Taylor in 
his statement in the opening ceremony, r offered to step down if that would bring 
peace (Ibid.). It indicated a good start for the negotiation. 
However, on the same day of the opening of the peace talk, another event 
occurred. The chief prosecutor of the Sierra Leone Special Court unexpectedly 
unsealed an indictment towards Charles Taylor containing charges of crime against 
humanity in Sierra Leone’s conflict (FBIS, 2003g). The peace talks suffered a blow 
due to this indictment. 
The Indictment and its Consequences 
The indictment from the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) went public when 
David Crane, the prosecutor at the SCSL, unsealed an indictment and a warrant of 
arrest for Taylor. The charges came as a result of Taylor’s alleged backing of the 
RUF during Sierra Leone’s civil war. The indictment constituted charges of the 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. Taylor was indicted on 17 accounts, ranging from “terrorizing the 
civilian population and collective punishments, sexual violence, use of child soldiers, 
abductions and forced labors, to attacks on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone 
personnel” (The Sierra Leone Special Court, 2003) 
The indictment had actually been issued on 7 March 2003, prior to its final 
public announcement. However, because the power of the court was limited to the 
jurisdiction of Sierra Leone, announcing it without a strategy would risk the prospect 
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of arresting the target. That was the reason for the announcement to wait until the 
timing was perfect. Crane felt that indicting Taylor might help to avoid what was 
perceived as Taylor’s manipulation of the peace talks in Ghana to secure an outcome 
favorable for his own future. As Crane put it:  
 
It was very apparent that in order to have a legitimate process the negotiators (in Ghana) 
had to know that they are dealing with an indicted war criminal so that once this card 
was turned over, a legitimate peace process could start, as opposed to one that would 
have eventually been considered a sham and a way of manipulating the good intentions 
of other nations so that one (participant) could survive and live another day which is 
what Charles Taylor’s ultimate motive was…He was using the Accra (Ghana) summit 
as another means by which he could hang on to political power and to manipulate 
events while the rebels began to move in Monrovia (See Cobb Jr., 2003) 
 
In statements about his decision to reveal Taylor’s indictment while the president was 
at the Ghana peace talks, Crane suggested that only outside of Monrovia would there 
have been a realistic chance of an arrest (Cobb Jr., 2003). As the jurisdiction of the 
Sierra Leone special court was limited to Sierra Leone only, it could not reach Taylor 
unless he was handed over to Sierra Leone special court or if he were outside the 
national border of Liberia.  
The Special Court applied a strict dogmatic approach in the post-conflict peace 
building in Sierra Leone.22 Being guided by the legalistic tools, it showed that the 
authorities in the Special Court did not share the same approach and standard as the 
other authorities in the region. The relativity between what is proper and should be 
done collided at the point when local custom met the universal value of legal system.  
Subsequent to this, Crane asked the Ghanaian government to hand Taylor over 
to the Special Court. Ghanaian government ignored Crane’s request, and let Taylor 
returned to Monrovia after the opening ceremony. Taylor immediately returned to 
Monrovia. At the same time LURD and MODEL also withdrew from the negotiation 
by claiming that “they will not negotiate with a war convict” (IRIN, 6 June 2003). 
Hence, they immediately mobilized their troops, heading towards Monrovia. As a 
                                                 
22 In the post-conflict peace building in Sierra Leone after Lomé Peace Accord in 1999, there were two organs 
established to deal with the process of reconstruction of the society in Sierra Leone: the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court in Sierra Leone. Although they were supposed to cooperate, 
their works did not consult each other. The Special Court rather fully functioned as an independent judicial 
entity (See Lamin, 2003 for details). 
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result of the indictment, the negotiation suffered a breakdown. The situation later 
developed into a critical condition, and forced an emergency decision to be taken.  
Ghana and Its Immediate Reaction 
The indictment came at a delicate moment as in short time LURD forces had 
advanced to the outskirts of Monrovia. The violent defeat of Taylor’s regime would 
become a virtual certainty if no negotiated solution could be reached. The ill-timed 
announcement of the indictment showed a clear lack of understanding of the regional 
politics dynamics (Aboagye & Bah, 2004). The Special Court’s inadequate 
consultation with ECOWAS and the Ghanaian government before unsealing the 
indictment indicated that the court disregarded the conflict dynamics in the region 
(p.4). 
Although arresting Taylor and handing him over to the court might have been 
the right thing for the Ghanaian government to do, it would have been viewed in 
many quarters as a breach of the norms of diplomacy and as a betrayal of traditional 
hospitality (p.4). Based on this, it was considered that the loyalty within the members 
of the heads of state was still strong. (Baker, 2004:1497). Thereby, other solution to 
overcome the situation should be initiated. 
The indictment was viewed as a direct attack on the West African attempts to 
find diplomatic solution to the Liberian crisis. The political leadership in West Africa 
found it unsuitable and disrespectful to corner a fellow African president and also 
completely at odds with their diplomatic initiatives. Crane’s dogmatic style, neither 
considered nor compromised the diplomatic practice attempted to find solution in 
Liberia (Bøås, 2005:87).  
Regarding Ghana’s immediate reaction to the indictment, one might consider 
the event back in 1990 when Doe was captured by Prince Johnson of INPFL. The 
Ghanaian authority was in charge of securing the situation. Nevertheless, the 
Ghanaian authority felt responsible for the murder of the late President Doe which 
took place when the ECOMOG Field Commander, General Arnold Quainoo was 
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commanding ECOMOG in Liberia.23 Unwilling to experience the same 
embarrassment, the Ghanaian authority put efforts not to repeat the same failure 
(Aboagye & Bah, 2004:4).  
Consequence 1: Military Option of the Warring Factions  
The indictment immediately bolstered the determination of LURD and MODEL to 
pursue a military option (Aboagye & Bah, 2004:3-4). This was clearly manifested 
when both groups hardened their positions at the negotiations, insisting that they 
would not negotiate with an indicted war criminal. Taylor, on the other hand, was 
determined to fight to the last. This option did not fit well for the civilian population 
in Monrovia, as they would be trapped in a heavy fighting with no prospect of 
escaping. 
One prompt attempt by ECOWAS to halt the escalation of violence was 
reached when the government signed a cease-fire agreement with the rebel groups 
(IRIN, 17 June 2003). However, Taylor withdrew his support for this agreement and 
the fighting continued for several days (IRIN, 23 June 2003). Nevertheless, continued 
aggression delayed the deployment of the Joint Verification Team which was 
established by the ceasefire accord.24
As the rebel force advanced to the outskirts of Monrovia and reached the 
northern district near the St. Paul’s River Bridge, the final crossing leading directly to 
the heart of the Monrovia; thousands of panicked civilians again fled the western 
suburbs for the city center. In response to this, Taylor announced “I will stand and 
fight until they stop killing my own people…My men must understand now that I’m 
going no place, nowhere, until the international community has sufficiently deployed 
troops in this country” (BBC, 2003). By this, Taylor clearly indicated his insistence to 
stay. On the other hand, LURD and MODEL also stood firm on their advancement 
towards Monrovia.  The stagnation caused by the indictment made a critical situation 
in Monrovia as the thousands of displaced persons were at risk.  
                                                 
23 The questions whether ECOWAS was deliberately handing off Doe to Prince Johnson was debatable since 
there were no sufficient fight from the ECOMOG troops defending Doe (Accounts on Doe’s abduction can be 
found in Ellis,1999; Huband, 1998). 
24 The Joint Verification Team was consisted of military observers from ECOWAS, the international 
community, and representatives from the LURD, MODEL, and the Liberian government with mandate to 
establish the position of all warring parties on the ground.  
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Consequence 2: Stagnation to the Peace Talks 
As fighting between the factions continued, West African mediators threatened to 
formally end the peace talks (International Crisis Group, 2003b). The facilitator of the 
peace talks, Abdulsalami Abubakar, appealed to all three groups to adhere to the 
cease-fire (IRIN, 26 June 2003). ECOWAS and the diplomatic community in West 
Africa tried all they could to bring back the confidence and to mend the negotiation 
process. Seemingly, the efforts succeeded in resuming the negotiation. 
On the 18 July 2003 the participants in the Accra talks began analyzing a draft 
of the comprehensive peace document released by the mediators (IRIN, 19 July 
2003). In this draft, the mediators had proposed that the conference delegates select a 
president and a vice president to head a transitional government (Ibid.). Yet, the 
progress with the negotiation at this point was also stalled as both LURD and 
MODEL refused to sign a draft peace agreement (IRIN, 22 July 2003b).  
Both contingents were displeased by the lack of representation extended to 
them in the draft. It was stated that top government positions would be reserved for 
members of political parties and civil society groups that had not fought during the 
civil war (Ibid.). However, LURD rejected any political settlement that did not 
incorporate LURD in it, by arguing that “politicians could not disarm the fighters” 
(Ibid.). 
In order to safeguard the ultimate objective of the peace process, ECOWAS 
did everything to keep the peace process continued. The negotiation situation after 
indictment was characterized by the resistance of the LURD and MODEL on their 
demands in the negotiation. Furthermore, the battles continued and Taylor was 
cornered in Monrovia. This might lead to the win or lose situation. The urge of an 
intervention strategy was put forward, in order to save the situation for the sake of the 
civilians trapped in Monrovia.  
Unavoidable Humanitarian Crisis in Monrovia 
As the consequence of LURD’s military reaction, an estimated number of 200.000 
displaced Liberians from camps outside the capital city moved into the centre of 
Monrovia (International Crisis Group, 2003b:5). They were reluctant to go back to 
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their previous and permanent shelters because they were afraid of raids by the rebel 
groups that would be directed against them (Søfting 2006 [Telephone interview]).  
June in Liberia is in autumn and dominated by frequent heavy rain. Monrovia 
was practically an abandoned city with ruins marked by the fierce fightings that had 
taken place. People who fled to Monrovia barely found shelters to stay, so most of 
them lived on the street. Lack of sanitation, clean water, and medicine supplies made 
the displaced people vulnerable to diseases.25 The capital city was basically blocked 
and isolated. With LURD forces controlling the port, the food supply through the port 
was also cut. Starvation also became another problem for the displaced persons 
trapped in Monrovia (IRIN, 29 July 2003). 
As the heavy fighting continued throughout the week, LURD and MODEL 
forces advanced into the heart of Monrovia. They riddled the capital city with mortar 
fire and attempting to cut off roads to the interior (IRIN, 21 July 2003). Dozens of 
people were killed in what was the third major attack on Monrovia in less than two 
months. The deteriorating situation was reported by hundreds of bodies lying 
unattended on a main avenue that led from Monrovia to the suburbs (IRIN, 8 June 
2003). Most people, angered by the absence of any interventions by the US, placed 
the bodies of individuals killed by mortar fire in front of the gates of the US Embassy 
(IRIN, 22 July 2003a). The people’s demand on the US intervention was high. 
Eventually it never came during the critical period. At the time, at least 3000 people 
had died during the fierce fighting in Monrovia.  
 The humanitarian crisis in Monrovia of the June 2003 was considered by the 
diplomatic community in West Africa as the repetition of the similar emergency in 
the earlier phase of conflict. At the time Taylor’s NPFL advanced towards Monrovia 
which was also packed with fleeing civilians. Trying to avoid the similar disaster, the 
West African diplomatic community attempted prevention through the diplomatic 
ways. It was clear that if the rebel force were to be confronted with force; more 
damage to humanitarian situation would take place.  
                                                 
25 The situation with the displaced people and refugee in Monrovia; before and after Taylor’s departure was 
that the capacity of the Monrovia to endure floods of refugees exceeding the ability of what it could take. Due 
to long years of war there had been significant run-out of clean water and electricity in Monrovia, as the 
fighting had destroyed the entire basic infrastructure in the city (Søfting 2006 [Telephone interview]). 
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Steps leading to Pragmatism: the Safe Haven Arrangement 
The indictment indeed had made the negotiation close to complete breakdown. As 
LURD and MODEL resisted on military option, the humanitarian disaster turned out 
to be the fatal consequence of this option. LURD and MODEL also stood firm on 
their demands in the negotiation process. This sudden urge left no other choice but to 
create a win-win solution that contented everyone. Thus, it could not be achieved by 
the military means.  
Based on the approach of the thesis, it is the likely explanation that Obasanjo, 
the Nigerian president, came out with the option of proffering a safe haven for 
Taylor. Taylor’s exit was believed to meet the demands of the LURD and MODEL, 
thus might end the armed violence. Subsequently, after the indictment was made 
public, there were widespread rumors about a safe haven arrangement being prepared 
by Nigeria. Following the collapse of the Accra peace round, on 2 July 2003, Taylor 
discreetly sent his envoy, the Liberian foreign minister, Monie Captan to Nigeria and 
brought an undisclosed letter (FBIS, 2003h). This initial interaction could indicate 
Taylor’s consideration on the offer.  
However, it cannot be claimed that Obasanjo stood alone behind this decision. 
One must bear in mind that the decision was closely consulted by the international 
community and agreed by the diplomatic community in West Africa. The 
international community backed Obasanjo’s policy, thus justifying asylum as a way 
out of the civil war in Liberia. According to Sir Jeremy Greenstock, a senior UN 
diplomat, “as Nigeria does not have the law that would allow Taylor to be extradited 
to the special court in Sierra Leone; it was Obasanjo’s decision to make that offer 
public” (FBIS, 2003h). The situation that urged Obasanjo to take critical decision was 
based on the stagnation in the negotiation process. What could be explained is that 
the decision was taken as a result of the sudden urge towards the situation in 
Monrovia. Nigeria took the lead to find a way out from the deadlock. The decision 
was resulted from Obasanjo’s unilateral decision that bypassed the institutional 
regulations by ECOWAS. The decision of Obasanjo proved that individual played a 
significant role in West African diplomacy (Anda, 2000:126). In an emerging 
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humanitarian crisis, the arrangement was conducted in a strong ad hoc manner. 
Above all, it was the sense of pragmatism that strongly dictated. 
  Despite Taylor’s initial rejection of the plan, during Obasanjo’s visit to 
Liberia on the 6 July 2003, it was officially announced that Nigeria offered a safe 
haven for Taylor. ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Mohammed Ibn. Chambas termed 
Obasanjo’s visit as “a part of behind-the scene moves so that the peace process moves 
forward” (FBIS, 2003i). His remark could be seen as the support of the ECOWAS on 
the safe haven arrangement. Later on the same day, after meeting Obasanjo, Taylor 
reportedly accepted the offer in a term that was called “an orderly exit from power”, 
and agreed to transfer the presidency to Moses Blah, his vice president. (IRIN, 6 July 
2003; FBIS, 2003j).  
By accepting Obasanjo’s offer, Taylor avoided the fate of two of his 
predecessors, Tolbert and Doe, who were killed during their period of presidency. He 
also managed to avoid the prosecution from the Special Court in Sierra Leone (Bøås, 
2005). For LURD and MODEL, their demand throughout the peace talks was 
fulfilled as Taylor agreed to accept the safe haven arrangement. They indicated the 
willingness to negotiate. Consequently, the Accra peace talks was resumed.  
In reaction to Obasanjo’s decision, there were domestic polemics and debate in 
Nigeria, especially from the families of the Nigerian journalists that were killed by 
Taylor’s army (FBIS, 2003n). Ignoring the pressure, Obasanjo kept his terms with 
Taylor. It was highlighted that Obasanjo’s decision was unilaterally taken without 
considering and consulting the Nigerian Parliament (FBIS, 2003k). This marked a 
strong personal dimension in the safe haven arrangement.  
A theoretical explanation on this matter might utilize the conceptualization 
from Chabal and Daloz (1999). As the lack of clear cut and legitimate separation 
between the private and public domain, the politics in Africa were being transformed 
into informal manner. Occasionally, it was conducted in the framework of personal 
rule (p.6). Obasanjo’s decision was conducted within the personal rule. Being in an 
informal manner, he could overcome the procedural regularities within ECOWAS.  
It was the pragmatic decision that was steadfastly employed here. In the 
situation like Liberia, it was necessary to make a decision based on political 
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necessity, rather than to be held down by the weight of procedural matters while 
thousands of people were dying and others fleeing the country (Jaye, 2003:232). This 
decision was largely characterized by an ad hoc process, in which approach to be 
taken was determined at the last minute. (Anda, 2000:125). Thus, it was the ad hoc 
character that was evident. Obasanjo’s personal rule was also the source of the ad hoc 
characteristic in the decision. However, at the same time, the safe haven offer was 
only possible because Nigeria had sufficient resources to assume the bulk of the 
burden in securing Taylor’s exit from Liberia (Grant-Thomas & Taw,1999:71). 
International Endorsement to the Safe Haven Arrangement 
The support from the US might have been viewed as the most important support for 
Obasanjo’s decision. During an official visit to Nigeria from 11 –12 July 2003, Bush 
congratulated Obasanjo on the safe haven arrangement for Taylor. However, this can 
be interpreted as an endorsement from the US that the removal of Taylor from Liberia 
was the best interests of peace in Liberia (FBIS, 2003l). The US Secretary of State, 
Colin Powell, also indicated that the US would participate in a peacekeeping 
operation in Liberia. He said that “a transfer of power in Liberia would have to be 
facilitated and supported in some way by the US,” and that any military involvement 
would be conditioned on Taylor’s resignation (Stevenson, 2003). 
By taking this as a signal of approval from the international community, 
Obasanjo intensively started to run the regional diplomacy in furthering the term of 
the arrangement. One of the visits was conducted on 13 July 2003 when he visited 
Guinea’s president Lansana Conte (FBIS, 2003m). The most likely explanation is that 
these meetings could be seen as one of the efforts to socialize the decision of 
proffering an exit for Taylor, and make it known to the heads of state in West Africa.  
Obasanjo continued his prominent role in the post-indictment period. It has 
been suggested that Obasanjo alone took the role in safeguarding the peace process in 
Accra. Obasanjo’s visits to other states in West Africa were most likely conducted in 
order to coordinate his decision with the other states in West Africa. The absence of 
objections from the other West African states might indicate the awareness shared in 
the region. Every member state in ECOWAS seemed to realize that such sudden urge 
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in the Liberian situation needed a intervention strategy. Nigeria, as supported by the 
other West African states, determined to make the most urgent decision. The political 
pragmatism became the imperative consideration for the safe haven arrangement. 
Post-Safe Haven: Continuation of the Diplomacy 
Promptly after Taylor indicated his willingness to accept the safe haven arrangement, 
the peace negotiations in Accra shifted from talks of cease-fire condition to the 
formation of a transitional government (IRIN, 9 July 2003). Specifically, there were 
intense negotiations over who should head the interim government after Taylor’s 
departure. Diplomats at the talks indicated that up to forty two names had been 
suggested for the position (Ibid.). Representatives of the Liberian government 
indicated that the vice president of Liberia, Moses Blah, should take over as the 
constitution dictates. However, LURD and MODEL strongly disagreed to the idea 
while pointing to Blah’s close connection to Taylor.  
International Force Deployment as Security Guarantee in Liberia 
On the 25 July 2003, the US announced the deployment of its troops under the 
multinational force of the UN for a limited time and scope. This came shortly after 
ECOWAS announced to have a force consisting of 1.300 Nigerian troops to be 
deployed in a week. Despite the rebels’ promise to adhere to the cease-fire, intense 
fighting occurred over the weekend of 26-27 July 2003 (IRIN, 27 July 2003). 
  In the period of July 2003, ECOWAS made progress toward the deployment of 
a peacekeeping force known as the ECOWAS Military Mission (ECOMIL) into 
Liberia. The first group of the Nigerian-dominated ECOMIL arrived in Liberia on 4 
August as a vanguard force. A number of 1.500 troops were placed on immediate 
standby, while ECOWAS expected to have in total 3.250 troops on the ground in 
Liberia consisting of the troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Mali (IRIN, 
31 July 2003).  
The decision on the ECOMIL deployment was taken during the Emergency 
Summit of ECOWAS concerning the crisis in Liberia. In that forum, Ghana’s 
President John Kufour urged fellow West African leaders to take a quick action to 
save Liberia from self-destruction (Ibid.). Again, it signified another character in the 
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West African diplomacy, that the critical issues were often negotiated at the highest 
level (Anda, 2000:126).  
Along with the peacekeepers’ arrival, the rebels agreed to hand over areas of 
the capital under rebel control to the peacekeepers and withdraw from Monrovia 
(IRIN, 4 August 2003). In response to the ECOMIL’s deployment, the US also sent a 
seven member marine team to clear the way for humanitarian relief and discuss 
logistical needs with Nigerian peacekeepers. Thousands of Liberians, exhausted by 
the long period of intense fighting, welcomed the peacekeepers as the troops moved 
into Monrovia on 6 August 2003 (IRIN, 7 August 2003). 
The Comprehensive Peace Accord on Liberia 
On the same day as the arrival of ECOMIL, a motion to approve Taylor’s resignation 
and his replacement by the vice president of Liberia, Moses Blah, was approved by 
the Liberian Senate and House of Representatives by a vote of 46 to 1 (IRIN, 7 
August 2003). On the 11 August 2003, Taylor resigned from the presidency of 
Liberia and went into exile in Nigeria (See Hoffman, 2006:315-320 for details). On 
the same day Taylor arrived in Nigeria, where he was welcomed in a presidential 
ceremony. Immediately after Taylor’s resignation, Blah took the oath of office as the 
president of the interim government of Liberia.  
The following day, on 12 August 2003, the LURD signed an accord to hand 
over control of the port of Monrovia within two days and to withdraw from Monrovia 
(IRIN, 12 August 2006). The Nigerian peacekeepers, accompanied by US Marines 
worked to secure food and aid to the citizens (IRIN, 15 August 2003).  
At the same time, Blah held talks with leaders of both the LURD and 
MODEL, expecting to finalize a peace agreement over the coming week. Responding 
positively towards the prospect of peace after Taylor’s exit, all parties agreed to sign 
the peace agreement. On 18 August 2003 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 
Liberia was signed (IRIN, 18 August 2003; FBIS, 2003p). It was acceptable for both 
LURD and MODEL to have the government of Liberia signing the peace agreement, 
without Taylor’s presence. As such, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement proved to 
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be the culmination of the peace process in the Liberian conflict. At this point we 
could suggest that the safe haven brought the finality to the conflict in Liberia.  
In the aftermath of Taylor’s departure, Blah conducted several visits to 
neighboring countries in West Africa. From 21-22 August 2003 he traveled to Cotê 
d’Ivoire to meet Gbagbo; followed by a visit to Nigeria to meet Obasanjo, and finally 
to Guinea to meet President Conte (FBIS, 2003q, 2003r).  There had been no official 
statements on details of these meetings. What is most likely to be discussed was the 
prospect concerning the transitional government of Liberia. At the same time, Charles 
Gyude Bryant, a 54-year-old businessman and leader of the Liberian Action Party, 
was selected chairman of the transitional government by the Liberian government, the 
LURD, and MODEL (IRIN, 21 August 2003). The establishment of the transitional 
government of Liberia indicated the country’s direction towards peace. 
Chapter Summary 
The intensive diplomatic efforts to bring the warring factions in the Liberian conflict 
met its success with the Accra peace talks. However, an indictment from the Sierra 
Leone Special Court brought the negotiation fell into a breakdown. Taylor, on the 
other hand, had no choices left due to the indictment. He was cornered, and might 
face both the prosecution and the military defeat. The security situation deteriorated 
rapidly in Monrovia, thus risking the thousands of civilian sheltered there. All of 
these became the factors behind the decision to remove Taylor peacefully from 
Liberia. They sketched out the background to the complex and difficult situation in 
Monrovia. 
The opportunity to escape the difficult situation emerged as Obasanjo threw a 
lifeline for Taylor. It was known as the safe haven arrangement. Within this invitation 
Taylor was promised to be protected and left untouched as he went to the asylum in 
Nigeria. The safe haven option was seen as the best solution; for Taylor, for LURD 
and MODEL, for the peace process, and the most important, for the civilian 
population in Monrovia.  
Taylor’s willingness to accept Obasanjo’s offer finally opened up a solution to 
the Liberian crisis. It transformed the situation of deadlock into a new settlement. The 
 53
diplomatic arrangement that transported Taylor out of Liberia helped to resume the 
negotiation process. In my view, the safe haven arrangement provided the conflict 
settlement in Liberia. Thus, it was needed for Liberia to move on with the 
establishment the transitional government and later, the democratic election.  
The arrangement showed the ad hoc character of the West African decision 
making process. This ad hoc manner was only possible due to the informal 
characteristic in the West African politics. In the safe haven arrangement, everything 
was highly personalized. It marked another significant characteristic in the West 
African diplomacy. The ability of Obasanjo to bypass the procedural regularities in 
ECOWAS turned out to save the peace talks in Accra. However, the emerging 
humanitarian crisis was the ultimate reson behind the provision of a safe haven for 
Taylor. From the practice of West African diplomacy, it was the notion of 
pragmatism that saved Liberia from a total humanitarian catastrophe. 
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V. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF DIPLOMACY IN WEST AFRICA 
 
The diplomacy in the Accra peace talks was the result of the ongoing 
diplomatic initiatives to bring the warring parties in Liberia to the negotiation. The set 
of diplomacy on the safe haven arrangement showed that the West African diplomacy 
was highly personalized. This personalized manner contributed to the adoption of 
pragmatism as the main characteristic in the diplomacy. Based on this, our discussion 
turns to the explanation of the personal role and the pragmatic characteristic in West 
African diplomacy. I will look at the elements from the regional security complex: 
the distribution of power and the pattern of amity and enmity and the aspects of the 
weak institutionalization of politics in Africa: the personalization of power and the 
importance of the vertical link; as the factors explaining the political dimension in the 
West African diplomacy.  
View from the Regional Security Complex Theory 
By definition, regional security complex is “a group of states whose primary security 
concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot 
realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 1991:23). It has 
significant security interdependence into each other. Its presence is distinguished by 
two basic elements: (1) the distribution of power between the states within a regional 
subsystem, and (2) patterns of amity and enmity among them. Returning to the 
research question of the thesis, this theory attempted to address the political factors 
that explain the character of the West African diplomacy. Thereby, it will examine 
the interaction among the states within the system. 
Power Relations: Weak Unipolarity in West Africa  
Power relations in a security complex operate through the concept of balance of 
power. Balance of power is defined as the situation where one or more states’ power 
is used to balance another state or group of states. Henceforth, the distribution of 
power among states in the system becomes the most important characteristic of the 
international system. 
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 The similar logic could also be applied when we try to asses the political 
dimension of the diplomacy in West Africa. Going through the literature on the 
Liberian conflict, one cannot leave out the role of Nigeria. In most analysis, Nigeria is 
claimed to be the most prominent actor, thus claimed the status as the regional 
hegemon in West Africa. It stands on the top of the hierarchy of power within the 
region. In order to maintain its status, often Nigeria initiated various political or 
military arrangements in the international affairs in West Africa.  
Looking back, Nigeria’s crucial role is clearly observable in the initial phase of 
ECOWAS’ intervention to Liberia, as Nigeria was the country that initiated the 
involvement. Nigeria’s initiative to establish and lead the ECOMOG was prompted 
by the ambition of its military leader to perform a leadership role in West Africa. The 
involvement continued, and Nigerian remained to perform as the backbone of the 
involvement. The military involvement of ECOWAS ended in the 1999, but 
ECOWAS remained involved diplomatically due to the engulfing tension in the 
Mano River areas.  
Through this diplomatic involvement, Nigeria’s hegemonic role was 
incorporated within the ECOWAS. Nigeria was not the sole actor of the initiatives. 
Other member states of ECOWAS, particularly the heads of state that assumed the 
position of chairman, also led the initiatives in the Mano River areas.  
Buzan and Wæver (2003:239) claimed that the West African RSC comprises a 
set of weak states, most of which are also weak powers, dominated by a regional 
power that is also a weak state. Based on this, is it then justifiable to consider Nigeria 
as the only power in the region to take the burden of military and political 
intervention? I argue that Nigeria plays an important role in the region, particularly in 
the case of Liberia. However, the role of the other states in West Africa should also 
be taken into consideration. 
A regional security complex, as noted by Buzan (1991) “should initially be 
characterized in terms of its power distribution,” adding that “where this power is 
dominant, states pursue security primarily by establishing and maintaining a 
‘suitable’ or stable distribution of power”. Nigeria, being the Africa’s most populous 
country and potentially one of its strongest in terms of exerting influence on 
 56
neighboring Africa states, plays a central role in shaping the emerging security 
architecture. Its high profile diplomacy and commitment of large human, logistical, 
and financial resources rendered Nigeria as the crucial force of ECOWAS (Bah, 
2005:79).  
What is then the stable distribution of power in the diplomacy of the Liberian 
conflict? In the case of Liberia, Nigeria kept its status as the main leader in 
ECOWAS’ various diplomatic initiatives. As the diplomacy was conducted within 
the institutional framework of ECOWAS, thereby Nigeria collaborates with the other 
member states of ECOWAS. As always occurred in the ECOWAS, the main actors of 
the most diplomatic initiatives were Nigeria and the chairman of ECOWAS.26
With regards to the Liberian crisis, ECOWAS was actively proposing peace 
talks for solving the tension in the Mano River areas. The ECOWAS diplomatic 
initiatives in March 2001 were led by the president of Nigeria, Obasanjo and the 
president of Mali, Konare, who was the chairman of ECOWAS at the time. The 
efforts that had been carried out were directed to ease the tension in Liberia.  
Nigeria and Mali were the driving force behind the ECOWAS initiatives. The 
results of the initiatives were the meetings between the heads of state involved in the 
Mano River crisis. The meetings were held and organized throughout the capital 
cities in West Africa, notably Abuja, Dakar, Ouagadougou, and Accra. The decision 
to conduct these meetings reflected the stable distribution of power within the state 
members of ECOWAS. Role and initiatives were equally distributed within the 
multilateral framework of ECOWAS. 
With regards to the involvement of ECOWAS in the Liberian conflict, the 
conflict became the major security concern for the other states in the region. During 
the first phase of the conflict, most of the fifteen member states of ECOWAS had 
contributed troops in ECOMOG. Some of them continued their involvement in the 
diplomatic initiatives during the period of Taylor’s presidency, namely Nigeria, 
Ghana, Senegal, and Mali. Although these heads of state were in the position as the 
                                                 
26 The organizational structure of ECOWAS was primarily occupied by two top positions. First is the Authority 
of Heads of State and Government, led by a chairman. The second is the ECOWAS Executive Secretary that 
functions notably with the operational issues of ECOWAS as an institution. The position of the Executive 
Secretary is appointed by the Authority of Heads of State and Government. 
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chairman of ECOWAS, de facto command of the organization was in the hand of 
Nigeria.  
Historically Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Côte d’Ivoire were known as the 
West Africa’s Big Four. It reflected the long established division between the 
Anglophone and the Francophone states in the region. Nigeria and Ghana represented 
the Anglophone states, while Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire represented the Francophone 
states. However, this division was evident during the involvement of the ECOMOG 
in the first phase of Liberian conflict. Côte d’Ivoire was completely against Nigeria in 
the deployment of ECOMOG. When Ghana joined the ECOMOG, its presence eased 
the tension between Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire that stood against the deployment of 
the troops. The later involvement of Senegal in ECOMOG stabilized the balance of 
power at that time (Grant-Thomas & Taw, 1999:75). 
The involvement of the other West African states in the diplomatic initiatives 
could be seen as an attempt to balance to dominance of Nigeria. However, during the 
second phase of the Liberian conflict, the friction between the Anglophone and the 
Francophone states was less evident. The most likely explanation to this was because 
the involvement was mainly done through the diplomatic manner, thus it was within 
the framework of ECOWAS. A clear attempt to balance the dominance of Nigeria in 
ECOWAS diplomatic initiatives was maintained by various states in West Africa, 
notably Ghana, Senegal, and Burkina Faso; hosted the meetings on the Liberian 
conflict. 
Within the initiatives of the Liberian conflict, it was evident that the 
interactions among the ECOWAS member states were conducted through a 
cooperative multilateral manner. We could see that the diplomatic initiatives created a 
harmonious diplomatic front that worked together to find mutual solution for the 
Liberian conflict. The consent from the ECOWAS member states was evident as they 
all involved in this diplomatic initiatives. However, this was the case in the process of 
diplomacy until the indictment on Taylor from the Sierra Leone Special Court was 
announced. 
With the indictment being announced, the Accra peace talks reached a 
deadlock. Consequently, the possibility of a complete breakdown of the peace 
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process was high. It was within this context that the safe haven arrangement for 
Taylor was prepared. Nigeria stood as architect of this arrangement. From this point 
on, the decision of the safe haven arrangement marked the shift in the character of 
diplomacy in West Africa. The safe haven arrangement was made with a strong 
unilateral dimension. 
With the prompt shift in its diplomatic approach, Nigeria stood out its status as 
a regional hegemon in West Africa. Thus, the decision by Nigeria signified the 
unipolarity of the security system of West Africa. The decision was later supported 
by ECOWAS. However, another regional consent upon this new arrangement was 
necessary. It was the likely reason behind Nigeria’s visits to various ECOWAS 
member states. The visits were intended to disseminate the condition upon which the 
safe haven arrangement was made. It did not take long until the new consent from the 
other ECOWAS member states towards the safe haven arrangement was achieved. 
Although the safe haven arrangement implied the hierarchical of power in 
West Africa, I would argue that the unipolarity of Nigeria is considerably weak. 
Nigeria still needed to seek the political support and to take the other states into 
consideration. It was understandable that the political support and consensus were 
important for the stable distribution of power in the region. However, if Nigeria were 
a strong unipolar power in West Africa, it would not need any consent upon its 
unilateral decision in safe haven arrangement. Without adequate consultation with the 
other states in West Africa, a political tension might emerge, thus risk the position of 
Nigeria.  
The support and endorsement from the international community was also 
needed by Nigeria. By securing the consent from the US and the AU, Nigeria had 
avoided any accusation against the safe haven arrangement. The backing from them 
provided a warranty that there would be no attempts to forcibly remove Taylor once 
he accepted the arrangement. Based on this, it might suggest one important factor in 
the balance of power in West Africa. Although Nigeria occupied the highest level of 
the hierarchy of power in West Africa, nonetheless, it has no sole position as the 
strong hegemonic power. Thus, by establishing a stable distribution of power, Nigeria 
needs the other states in the region to fill in the lower level in the hierarchy of power. 
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This is the function of the other states in West Africa, as the foundation that shaped 
the stable distribution of power in system. As such, their existence was also 
significant to balance the unipolarity of Nigeria. 
There is another point that justifies Nigeria’s central role in the region. It was 
the foreign policy orientation which was based on the concentric circle (Yoroms, 
1993:85). This conception sees Africa as the heart of Nigerian foreign policy. 
Accordingly, this formulation of Nigeria’s foreign policy “must be very closely 
connected with all things pertaining to the African continent”, and conceptualized as 
follow: 
… a pattern of concentric circles may be discernible in our attitude and response to 
foreign policy issues within the African continent and the world at large. At the 
epicenter of these circles are the national economic and economic interests of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, which are inextricably tied up with the security, 
stability, and economic and social well being of our immediate neighbors. One of 
our principal priorities is to put on more constructive footing relations with our 
neighbors with which we share identical stability and peace (Ibid.). 
 
Based on this, it is evident that Nigeria perceived West Africa as the closest arena. By 
positioning Nigeria at the heart of the region, the conception subjectively views the 
other states in the region as being lower in the hierarchy of power. In understanding 
the unilateral dimension of Nigeria in the safe haven arrangement, it can thus be 
suggested that by being a weak unipolar power in West Africa, Nigeria secured the its 
decision by having the supports from the West African states and the international 
community. 
The Distorted Line of Amity and Enmity in West Africa 
The second element in the regional security complex is on the pattern of amity and 
enmity. The pattern of amity and enmity comes as the firm result of the power 
distribution in the region. It depicts the coherent patterns of security interdependence 
and may take the standard forms of rivalry, competition, or the alliance pattern among 
the main powers within the region (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:47). By amity, Buzan 
understood the relationships ranging from genuine friendship to expectation of 
protection and support. Meanwhile, enmity is understood as the relationship defined 
by suspicion and fear (p.189-190). 
 60
 The discussion on the pattern of amity and enmity in West Africa will always 
refer to the long-standing rivalry between two main political blocs: the                     
Anglophone and Francophone. The discussion on the distribution of power in West 
Africa has briefly touched upon this point. Being established during the colonization 
era, this delineation marked the distinction between the former British colonies from 
the French ones, and shaped the pattern of alliances in the region. 
The complete story of this competition in West Africa goes far back in the 
history of the region. However, the immediate precursor marking the competition 
between these two blocks in the Liberian conflict emerged when NPFL launched its 
initial attack in 1989. Both Francophone states, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, 
actively supported Taylor’s revolt and set the enmity line against any ECOWAS 
involvements.  
It was evident from the literature that most of the French-speaking states were 
less cooperative towards ECOWAS military engagement in Liberia. Côte d’Ivoire 
even brought about the competition to a larger arena. Côte d’Ivoire was a member of 
the UN Security Council when the Liberian conflict initially erupted in 1989. It then 
tried to dissuade the Liberian conflict to be incorporated on the council’s agenda 
(Aning, 1994). The attempt succeeded and the states in West Africa were left alone to 
find a solution for Liberia. 
The other Francophone states, such as Burkina Faso, reacted aggressively on 
ECOMOG’s deployment and claimed that ECOWAS should not interfere with 
Liberia’s domestic issue (Grant-Thomas & Taw, 1999:60). However, Senegal was the 
only Francophone state that persuasively announced its objection due to Nigeria’s 
lacking of political consultation with other ECOWAS member states.  
Sierra Leone and Guinea contributed troops in the first deployment of 
ECOMOG. Hence, they became the enemies of Taylor’s NPFL. The hostility pattern 
was sustained even after Taylor assumed the presidency in Liberia. This was the 
reason to the tension along the Mano River area in sequence with Liberia’s second 
phase of conflict.  
Since 2001 the three countries in Mano River areas were trading accusations 
on cross-border attacks from each other’s territory. Liberia intensified the tensions by 
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expelling the ambassadors Sierra Leone and Guinea out of Liberia. This caused a 
diplomatic tension within the region. The diplomatic initiatives by ECOWAS later 
eased the tension. Under the sponsorship of ECOWAS, the three heads of state in 
Mano River region agreed to meet and reduce the violence. 
At this point, the process of diplomacy in West Africa was notably 
characterized by the shift from non-cooperative to cooperative behavior. It implied 
the shift in the pattern of enmity and enmity in the region However, the weakening of 
Taylor’s power due to the UN economic sanctions might also contribute to the shift 
towards a cooperative direction. 
It is relevant to conclude that the relationship between the states in West 
Africa is not firmly embedded with the institution of state, rather depends on the head 
of state in power. Additionally, the regional divide does not always mean that the 
distinction among the different groups would eventually burst into an open hostility. 
It will go along the pendulum of competition or rivalry. As such, the hostility can also 
take form in the ignorance of the other states. Ignorance and non-cooperative 
behavior can also be understood as the reflection of enmity although the level is less 
intense than an open hostility. 
The West African diplomatic process in the 2001 also marked a significant 
change in accordance with the pattern of amity and enmity. Burkina Faso, previously 
was a strong opponent of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, changed its political 
standing into a cooperative behavior along with the negotiation process in the Mano 
River area. An immediate effect of the shift in Burkina’s political standing was 
marked by Obasanjo’s first visit to Ouagadougou (FBIS, 2001b). The reason of visit 
was most likely to establish a bilateral economic cooperation. The presidential visit, 
thus, stood for a symbol of the good relationship among the West African heads of 
state (Anda, 2000:126). Any political consequences that followed, contributed to the 
shift of Burkina’s position. 
The visit was the easing of tension between the two countries that had always 
held divergent views on the conflicts in West Africa. With the reconciliation among 
the two states, they were on the same wavelength. The shift towards the cooperative 
behavior reflected the direction towards amity. The pattern of amity was shown 
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through Burkina’s consent for hosting the Ouagadougou meeting in 2002. It was the 
meeting called for the establishment of the international contact group on Liberia. 
The so-called Ouagadougou-Abuja axis marked the new significant shift in the 
pattern on amity in West Africa.  
The unstable pattern between the amity and enmity was shown by Côte 
d’Ivoire. As previously presented, Côte d’Ivoire showed a high level of hostility 
towards the ECOWAS’ involvement in Liberia. At one point during the first phase of 
conflict, Nigeria and ECOWAS persuaded Côte d’Ivoire to become actively involved 
in the peace process (Francis, et.al., 2005:124). This was seen by Côte d’Ivoire as a 
way to challenge Nigeria’s dominance, and resulted in Côte d’Ivoire hosted the 
Yamoussoukro peace process in 1991.  
To some extent, Côte d’Ivoire did not play any major role, nor showed any 
open hostility during the remaining involvement of the ECOWAS. However, at the 
end of 2002 Côte d’Ivoire returned to a less cooperative standing. The reason for this 
was the allegation of Taylor supported rebel group in Côte d’Ivoire. The returning of 
Côte d’Ivoire to the pattern of enmity implied that it was a reaction to a direct 
security threat posed by Taylor. However, it was rather difficult to categorize in 
which pattern Côte d’Ivoire belonged to. Nevertheless Côte d’Ivoire still took part in 
the part of any assessment mission to Liberia. The likely explanation for this is that 
Côte d’Ivoire differentiated the forum to which it presented its political standing. 
Bilaterally, it posed an open political opposition towards Liberia. Multilaterally, it 
maintained its involvement within ECOWAS. To discuss further, one needs to look at 
the conception of the Côte d’Ivoire’s foreign policy. 
 Senegal poses a distinct pattern in the amity and enmity relations in West 
Africa. It belongs to the Francophone group, but does not pose any hostilities, notably 
in ECOWAS involvement in Liberia. The held firm perception that when one country 
belongs to the Francophone group, then it ought to show a pattern of enmity towards 
the Anglophone, is not present in the case of Senegal. However, Senegal does play a 
role in balancing the dominance of Nigeria. In the beginning Senegal balanced 
Nigeria by deploying additional troops to strengthen the ECOMOG forces already on 
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the ground. Senegal thus mended the allegation that Francophone states refused to 
join a Nigerian-dominated military mission. 
In the West African diplomatic initiatives on the second phase of the Liberian 
conflict, Senegal continued to take an active role. In a likely attempt to balance 
Nigeria, Senegal also hosted the Dakar meeting for the Mano River crisis in 2001. 
However, in the aftermath of the indictment and notably when Nigeria took over the 
process by preparing the safe haven arrangement, at the same time Senegal held the 
responsibility to mediate the Ivorian crisis. Based on this, I tend to argue that Senegal 
posed a pattern of amity in the West African diplomacy. However, it is also important 
to notice that the distribution of tasks is a feature commonly accepted in West Africa. 
The affable rivalry between Nigeria and Senegal tends to show the pattern of amity 
among them. However, the delineation according to Francophone and Anglophone 
groups brought the two states into consensus on who should be in charge in taking the 
leadership in one particular issue in West Africa. 
 The discussion on the pattern of amity and enmity which was shown in the 
ECOWAS diplomatic initiatives in the Liberian conflict signified what I suggest as 
the obscure delineation bordering the amity and enmity poles in the region. Indeed, 
there existed suspicion and fear in the region, but most of the countries showed a 
cooperative attitude towards the efforts led by ECOWAS. The notion on peace and 
security in the region turned out to be common goal sought by all states in the region. 
 Based on the cooperative idea, some states in West Africa clearly made their 
political standing on Liberian conflict sound. The dependence of Guinea, Gambia, 
and Sierra Leone on Nigeria’s subsidies encourages their willingness to follow 
Nigeria’s lead (Grant-Thomas & Taw, 1999). Mali and Togo, both contributed on 
hosting peace talks concerning the Liberia crisis, was because their heads of state 
were in the position of the chairman of ECOWAS.  
West Africa also witnessed the significance of Nigeria and Ghana that played 
central role, militarily and diplomatically, throughout the ECOWAS engagement in 
Liberia. Both Nigeria and Ghana are Anglophone states; and both have committed 
close ties with any peace processes in the region. Ghana, whose economic and 
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military capability in economy and military is below Nigeria, is also superior in 
comparison with the rest of the region. 
Despite their being in the same alliance, according to Buzan and Wæver 
(2003), the relationship between Nigeria and Ghana was not purely amity. Date back 
to the first ECOMOG mission, the differences in their peacekeeping approach marked 
the tension that characterized the relations the two states (Grant-Thomas & Taw, 
1999:66). To mediate the difference between the two states, it required frequent 
compromise within ECOWAS, particularly during the first phase of the conflict. 
 However, these differences do not separate Nigeria and Ghana to unite in an 
alliance throughout the involvement process. Notably with the diplomatic initiatives 
leading to the Accra peace talks, the president of Ghana, John Kufour was elected as 
the chairman of ECOWAS. Thus, engaged with Nigeria, Ghana continued the 
diplomatic initiatives that finally led to the Accra peace talks. 
As the diplomatic activities intensified, a sense of pragmatism and 
compromise have become the common term in West Africa. The sudden urge to 
prevent the Accra peace talks into a complete breakdown made West African heads 
of state gave their immediate consent towards the safe haven arrangement. I argue 
that the key to such consent in a divided region with different political agenda is the 
incentive.  
With regards to the Liberian conflict, the lasting peace was the primary 
incentive for the region. The stability and security of the region would be the main 
incentive for the diplomatic initiatives on the Liberian conflicts. Regardless any 
political standing, the desire for the incentive was sufficient to overcome even the 
strong, historical rivalry between the Francophone and Anglophone states. Thereby I 
argue that within the distorted line of the amity and enmity in West Africa it was the 
incentive on the lasting peace that became the compromising point of any diplomatic 
initiatives in the Liberian conflict. This was also the case with the safe haven option. 
Despite being resulted from a unilateral diplomatic arrangement, it was well accepted 
among the West African states. It was again the incentive that played an important 
role in reflecting the pragmatism as the evident characteristics in the West African 
diplomacy. 
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The explanation on the unipolarity of power and the distorted line of amity and 
enmity in West African depicts an exterior understanding behind the political factors 
within the state level that explains the character of diplomacy in West Africa. 
Moreover, in its claim on West Africa as a fairly weak security regime (p. 64) one 
might relate the weakness with the nature of African states. Security regime might be 
weak because of many reasons. One of those is that the states comprising the regime 
face challenges with regards to their power and capabilities. 
 However, if we return to each member state in the region of West Africa, 
another question might arise as one cannot dismiss the role of the head of state in 
West Africa. This is also the concern of the thesis that the interaction between units 
(the states) in the system (the West Africa region) could potentially be seen as the 
representation of the individuals in power. Regarding the personal role in African 
politics, thoughts from Chabal and Daloz would complement the analysis of the 
political dimension in the diplomacy. In general it posed the question whether the 
policy, preference, and interaction on the state level was genuinely based of the 
constituent that comprised the state, or merely the reflection of the leaders.  
Weak Institutionalization of the Political Practices in Africa 
According to Chabal and Daloz (1999:31) power in Africa is weakly institutionalized 
and remains essentially personalized and particularistic. The legitimacy of the state is 
not automatically emancipated from the society and not constituted in the political 
institutions (p.5). Based on this main argument, the ECOWAS diplomacy in the 
Liberian conflict, instead of represented the interaction among states in West Africa; 
it reflected the interaction among the head of states. In the light of the role of the 
individuals, we gain deeper understanding concerning the political dimension in the 
process of diplomacy. The two central arguments that will be emphasized here are: 
(1) the personalization of power in West Africa, and (2) the overriding importance of 
vertical links within the political system.  
The Highly Personalized Power Relations in West Africa 
In West Africa, and much of the Africa, diplomacy has really been about the politics 
of personality (Aluko, 1977 in Adibe, 1997:482). Personalities played a significant 
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role in African diplomacy. It enhances the role of leader as the formulator of foreign 
policy (Anda, 2000:126). In assessing the involvement of ECOWAS in the Liberian 
conflict, there had been numerous personal interactions which were largely held 
among the head of states. Thus, it strengthened the dimension of the personal role in 
the process of diplomacy.  
The personal relations during the Liberian conflict were present since the first 
phase of the conflict. The 1996 political agreement between Taylor and the Nigerian 
president at that time, Sani Abacha, showed this dimension of personal relations.  
Having united by mutual interests, both of them reached an agreement that brought 
Taylor into the presidential position in Liberia. Another example on how personalities 
played crucial point here was when the AU leadership tried to find solution to the 
Liberian conflict without involving the AU in the arrangement. Their persuasion to 
Nigeria’s head of state, Ibrahim Babangida, was also conducted through a personal 
interaction. However, Nigeria’s willingness to start a regional initiative on the 
Liberian conflict was very much based on Babangida’s domestic political agenda. 
 At this point it is important to pose a question on whose interest that might be 
represented here. The national interest is thus entangled with the leader’s interest. The 
consequence of this entanglement is to be found in the transformation of politics as 
being informal. The informalization of politics is conducted in the framework of 
personal rule. As such, it can be personalized because there is a lack of clear cut and 
legitimate separation between private and public domain.  
Prior to the indictment most of the efforts to mediate the Liberian conflict were 
negotiated at the highest level at the regional forum, mostly through the summit 
meetings (Anda, 2000:126). The heads of state such as the president of Nigeria, 
Obasanjo; the president of Mali, Alpha Konare, later succeeded by Toumani Toure; 
the president of Ghana, John Kufour; the president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, the 
president of Togo, Gnassinbe Eyadema, and the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise 
Compaore, rendered the consensus of the region sound by participating into the 
diplomatic initiatives.  
Another point asserted by Chabal and Daloz (1999: 6) is on the various levels 
of social identification and loyalties which exist in the African societies that facilitate 
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the interaction and exchange in the personalization of power. The loyalty and the 
social identification within the safe haven arrangement could be found among the 
heads of state in West Africa. The decision of Ghana for not arresting Taylor as 
requested by the Sierra Leone Special Court could be seen as an illustration to this. 
 However, the loyalty and social identification is not merely addressed to the 
head of state as a personal, rather it is subjected to the institution of the head of state 
itself. The explanation to this is likely to be found in the neo-patrimonial state of 
Africa. Once an individual assume the position of a head of state, this individual will 
be respected. It is a shared understanding among the heads of state on their holding 
on to power. As a consequence, they grow loyalty among each other. 
Based on this kind of loyalty, the issues that emanates in the region are to be 
solved according to the West African solution. By this I understand, that the regional 
sovereignty are not to be interfered with any external actors. With regards to the 
diplomatic initiatives in the Liberian conflict, I would argue that the diplomatic 
initiatives that had been orchestrated by the West African diplomatic community 
were not to be devastated by the Sierra Leone Special Court, as an external actor. 
Another kind of solution appropriate for the norms in the region could be arranged 
instead. 
 At this point, we could return to the issue of the distorted line that bordering 
the amity and enmity in the region. Despite the relative suspicion among them, the 
West African leaders performed a cooperative manner. The reason was again to be 
found in the incentive when the diplomatic initiatives succeeded. Thereby, in order to 
achieve the incentive, the approaches were conducted through the diplomatic 
initiatives. Additionally these initiatives were characterized by the high degree of 
personal role. Frequent personal interactions between the West African heads of state, 
undoubtedly marked the highly personalized power relations in the region (Anda, 
2000:126).  
The character of personal role was even more evident as the safe haven 
arrangement was initiated by Obasanjo. It was made within the framework of 
personal rule. This unilateral dimension also made Obasanjo ignored the domestic 
opposition against this arrangement. Based on this, Obasanjo added another 
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individualistic character into the process of diplomacy that had been personalized 
already.  
 This reflection of the personalization of power showed another point on the 
complexities in African politics. Whereas domestically the leaders must seek support 
from their clientele, what is taking place regionally reflected the similar notion. The 
leaders also need to seek support and alliance from its regional clients.  The 
engagement of the other states within an alliance and the consequence emanating 
from it will be discussed in the following part. 
“Big Men” in West African Power Politics  
What is significant in Africa is the extent to which the vertical and personalized 
relations actually drive the logic of the political system. It is the ultimate ambitions of 
those who have power to establish their standing as Big Men (Chabal-Daloz, 
1999:15). It is important for the leader to establish the status as the “Big Men”, 
because this status will entail the benefits and other privileges, including support and 
respect from the clients. 
The logic exists in the domestic level is that the leaders seek support from their 
clients.  This thesis attempts to apply the logic of the “Big Man” into the regional 
setting. However, it implies a correspondence with Buzan and Wæver’s term on 
balance of power. With Nigeria as the main polar in West African regional politics, it 
is thus necessary to perform the leadership regionally. It is also important to be 
recognized as the primus inter pares among all “Big Men”, the superior among the 
equals, and to be on the top of the hierarchical of power. 
 The conception of the importance of a vertical rule in West African politics 
explains the dominance and leadership of Nigeria. By returning to the concentric 
principle on Nigeria’s foreign policy, it reflects that in West Africa, Nigeria is seen as 
the main polar of power and grow political leverage from the other states. The 
reputation as one of the “Big Four”, for instance, showed the hegemony of Nigeria. 
Turning to the larger concentric circle, we will find the continent of Africa. By 
briefly touching upon the role of AU and the other big powers in Africa, it was 
evident that Nigeria is considered to be one of the significant players in the continent. 
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By having the AU leader approached and encouraged Nigeria to take the lead in West 
Africa, it marked a broader conception on balance of power in the continent. The 
presence of the president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki and the president of 
Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano in welcoming Taylor into exile in Nigeria also 
represented the continental support for the safe haven arrangement. 
 The endorsement from the international community, particularly from the US 
was an important remark on the justification needed by Nigeria. Moreover the US 
defended Nigeria’s policy by saying that “President Obasanjo should not be asked to 
be unfaithful to the commitment he made to provide asylum to former Liberian 
President Charles Taylor in 2003” (Kramer, 2005). It is the reflection that the US, the 
global power in international level, supported the arrangement. Nonetheless it created 
a new international accreditation for Nigeria, to be one of the respective states, thus 
eliminating its previous pariah status. By offering the safe haven arrangement, the 
credibility and political leverage of Nigeria were enhanced regionally and 
internationally. Thus, it strengthened the status of Obasanjo as the “Big Man” in West 
Africa. 
Chapter Summary 
Four factors were established in this chapter to discuss the political dimension of the 
conduct of diplomacy in Liberian conflict. These factors are: the weak unipolarity of 
power in West Africa, the distorted line of amity and enmity, the highly personalized 
power relations in West Africa, and the importance of the ‘Big Men’ status in West 
African politics. 
Primarily, the major finding was on Nigeria’s dominance in the region. It 
pursued stability and security in the region by initiating the negotiation and peace 
process regarding Liberian conflict. In its efforts there were also the involvements 
from other states in the region—whether in the direction of cooperative or non-
cooperative—thus they could be seen as attempts to balance the dominance of 
Nigeria and preserving the stable distribution of power.  
The degree of cooperation which was shown by the West African states could 
broadly be classified under the pattern of amity and enmity. Accordingly, one will 
 70
always refer to the long-standing rivalry between two main blocs: the Anglophone 
and Francophone in West Africa. The distinct line of amity and enmity in the first 
phase of Liberian conflict, turned into the less-hostile diplomatic initiatives which 
were employed heavily during Taylor’s presidency. It reflected the obscure 
delineation between amity and enmity poles. The factor of incentive towards the 
common goal for peace and security in the region became the bond to overcome even 
the strong, historical rivalry between the Francophone and Anglophone states.  
However, the exterior understanding which was provided by these political 
factors in the diplomacy was complemented by the other conceptions in African 
politics. Diplomacy in West Africa has been very much about the politics of 
personality. Numerous personal linkages and interactions were held among the head 
of states, and it enhanced the magnitude of personal role in the process. In the 
framework of personal rule, the national interest and the leader’s personal interest 
might combine at the same time.  This character of the personalization of power was 
even more apparent after Obasanjo offered safe haven to Taylor. 
With Obasanjo being in the center of the decision, it came to the extent where 
the vertical and personalized relations actually drive the logic of the political system. 
By establishing the “Big Man” status for Nigeria, it is even more important to 
perform leadership and being recognized as the primus inter pares among all leaders 
in the region. Along with the notion of Nigeria as the heart of the West African 
security system, the logic on the concentric principle on Nigeria’s foreign policy is 
being put forward. The concern over the vertical rule in West African politics, in 
African politics and in international politics, explains the dominance and leadership 
of Nigeria in the safe haven arrangement. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
At the last part of the thesis we will now return to the research questions which 
inquired the West African diplomacy that brought about Taylor’s safe departure to 
Nigeria. First, we asked on the factors that made the safe haven arrangement was 
agreed as a measure for ending the Liberian conflict. Secondly, we asked on how the 
diplomacy in West Africa was conducted with regard to Taylor’s exit. Thirdly, we 
asked the political factors that explain the character of diplomacy in West Africa 
towards the safe haven arrangement as a strategy of conflict settlement in Liberia. 
Looking through the Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The working hypothesis is that Taylor’s exit was necessary to end the conflict in 
Liberia. In a condition where the peace talks had reached a deadlock and the 
possibility of a complete breakdown of the peace process was high, the ad hoc safe 
haven arrangement for Taylor was made. Taylor’s exit was believed to break the 
deadlock and bring peace to Liberia. Thus, it was seen as the pre-requisite for 
transition and lasting peace. The discussion on the West African diplomacy provided 
two dimensions of the safe haven arrangement: the direct concerns for the safe haven 
arrangement and the political factors that explain the characters of the West African 
diplomacy. 
On the Direct Concerns for Taylor’s Exit Arrangement 
Dated back to the first phase of the Liberian conflict, we viewed that the lack of 
viable international attention left the West African states to settle the problem in 
Liberia through the framework of the ECOWAS. Notably after Taylor assumed the 
presidency in the 1997 election, diplomatic engagement was highly employed by 
ECOWAS with regard to the continuation of the crisis in the Mano Rivers areas, 
along the border of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. 
 The continuous diplomatic initiatives as presented in the chapter four led us to 
understand that ECOWAS remained in charge for the peace talks as the armed 
tension in the Mano River areas intensified. With regard to the obstacles in the 
Liberian conflict, ECOWAS had conducted quite a remarkable piece of regional 
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diplomacy when they convinced all major parties to negotiate in the Accra peace talks 
on in June 2003.  
However, there were other actors involved with their own agendas. The 
indictment from the Sierra Leone Special Court went public on the same day when 
the negotiation started in Ghana. As the consequence of it, the negotiations broke 
down, LURD and MODEL switched to the military option, and the humanitarian 
crisis following the indictment became the direct concern over the preparation of the 
an ad hoc safe haven arrangement  
 The ill-timed announcement of the indictment triggered certain impediments 
that led to a crisis in Liberia. First, the indictment immediately bolstered the refusal 
of LURD and MODEL to negotiate and to pursue a military option instead. It led to 
the second consequence of the negotiation deadlock with the possibility of a complete 
breakdown was high. Efforts to uphold the ceasefire agreement, combined with the 
threat of the mediator to call off the peace talk proved ineffective as the rebel forces 
were advancing towards Monrovia with heavy artillery. Taylor, on the other hand, 
was determined to fight to the last. The armed escalation led to a humanitarian 
disaster for the thousands of inhabitants and internally displaced that sought refuge in 
Monrovia. 
Trying to halt the disaster, the West African diplomatic community tried to 
create a solution to the crisis. It was clear that if the rebel force were confronted with 
force; it would be more damaging to the humanitarian situation. For the ultimate 
reason of halting the bloodbath in Monrovia, the safe haven arrangement was made. 
On the Diplomatic Path towards Accra Peace Process  
The thorough steps along the peace process in Liberian conflict reflected the success 
story of the West African diplomatic community in the conflict mediation in the 
region. The scope of this diplomatic effort was quite intensive. By then the region did 
not only witness the upsurge in Liberia, but also in Guinea and Sierra Leone. It made 
the task of bringing peace to the Mano River areas a big challenge. At this point 
ECOWAS did not only emphasize the regional diplomacy, but also sought support in 
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the continental level by engaging the AU as the important player in the continent; and 
primarily the international community. 
 The diplomatic initiatives within ECOWAS implied the importance of the 
personal factor, with the emphasis on the role of the heads of state in the region. It 
takes place in the numerous personal interactions and presidential visits. It is also of 
importance to mark that crucial issues in the region were discussed within the summit 
level of the regional forum. 
However, the indictment towards Taylor created difficult situation in the peace 
process. The peace talks reached a deadlock and the possibility of a complete 
breakdown of the peace process was high. A breakout from this situation arose as the 
president of Nigeria, Obasanjo, offered a safe haven arrangement for Taylor. Safe 
haven is a diplomatic arrangement aimed to give protection towards a leader in a 
country for the purpose of terminating a crisis. 
Taylor’s willingness to accept this arrangement finally paved the way for the 
solution to the Liberian crisis. It created the conflict settlement and it was believed to 
bring an end to the crisis. I also conclude that Taylor’s exit was needed by Liberia to 
resume with the next sequence of conflict management, by establishing the 
transitional government and democratic election.  
Obasanjo’s decision on the safe haven arrangement showed that the notion of 
personal role was more dominant in comparison with the pre-indictment diplomatic 
initiatives. However, by overcoming any regularity within ECOWAS, Obasanjo’s 
option was conducted and implemented in an ad hoc manner. To conclude, the safe 
haven arrangement was a pragmatic solution to an emerging humanitarian crisis that 
avoided Liberia from the total humanitarian catastrophe.  
On the Explanation of the Characters of West African Diplomacy 
The characters of the diplomatic initiatives that led to the safe haven arrangement 
could be concluded as pragmatic and personal. However, I have discussed in Chapter 
V the four political factors that explain the political dimension in the diplomatic 
practice in West Africa.  
By looking at the unipolarity of power in the regional politics, the first factor is 
on Nigeria’s dominance in the region. The dominance is exercised through the 
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diplomatic initiatives within ECOWAS, but it became more evident when Nigeria 
proposed a safe haven arrangement for Taylor. Being the dominant power in the 
region, Nigeria is entitled to a status of regional hegemon. Thereby, it could take a 
pragmatic unilateral decision by providing an ad hoc safe haven arrangement. 
Nigeria’s unipolarity is considerably weak as it still needs to secure support from the 
regional, continental, and international community on its decision.  
Subsequent to the first factor, there is a degree of interaction among the states 
that could be categorized as the pattern of amity and enmity in West Africa. 
Accordingly, one will always refer to the long-standing rivalry between the 
Anglophone and Francophone in West Africa. The clear delineation between amity 
and enmity in the first phase of Liberian conflict turned to distorted line during 
Taylor’s presidency. It is the second political factor that shaped the character of the 
diplomacy. The less-hostile diplomacy was heavily employed in this period. Based on 
the distorted line, the delineating line was somewhat indistinct on whether a state 
posed a strong amity or enmity towards the diplomatic initiatives in the Liberian 
conflict. Most of the states tended to perform along the cooperative manner towards 
the process in Liberia. The most important, it was the incentives on peace and 
security in the region that made all states cooperated, thus overcoming the strong, 
historical rivalry in the region.  
The first two factors explaining the character of diplomacy are based on the 
interaction among the states in West Africa. However, it is also important to mark 
that the states in (West) Africa had a particular character concerning the power 
embodied in the state. As argued by Chabal and Daloz (1999) power in Africa is 
weakly institutionalized and remains essentially personalized and particularistic. 
Based on this, it is important to note that the diplomacy which was held during 
ECOWAS’ involvement in Liberian conflict, instead of representing the interaction 
among states in West Africa; could be perceived as the reflection of the interaction 
among the head of states.  
The consequence of the intermingling notions on the national interest and the 
leader’s interest made the transformation of politics as being informal and personal. 
This became the third factor in shaping the diplomacy in West Africa. By conducting 
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the policy in the framework of personal rule, it explained the lack of clear cut and 
legitimate separation between the private and public domain. However, the 
diplomatic initiatives in Liberian conflict involved various personalized relations 
among the head of states in West Africa. With the indictment was made public, 
Obasanjo’s decision marked another personal dimension in West African diplomacy. 
From that point on personal rule is proved to be a significant factor played in the 
process of diplomacy. 
 The reflection of the personalization of power showed another point of 
complexities in African politics. As happened in the domestic politics, the leaders 
also need to seek support and alliance from their regional counterparts.  Supports 
were obtained through similar kind of personal interaction, thus were materialized 
into the regional consent towards the safe haven arrangement. 
With Obasanjo being closely associated with the safe haven arrangement it 
signified the dominance and leadership of Nigeria in the region. However, the 
dominance of Nigeria marked the importance of the vertical rule in West African 
politics. I put this as the fourth factor that shapes the diplomacy in West Africa. As 
Nigeria saw the importance of vertical rule in West African politics, it was essential 
to establish an image of the hierarchy of power with Nigeria on the top of it. The so-
called “Big Man” status for Nigeria is a highly important notion to perform 
leadership and to be recognized as the strongest among all leaders in the region.  
Seemingly these four factors create an intertwined pattern in the explanation of 
the character of diplomacy. Both the factor of the weak unipolarity of power and the 
importance of vertical rule, have underlined the importance of the notion of ‘power’ 
and ‘status’ in establishing a stable hierarchy of power in the region. Being on the top 
of the hierarchy of power is something ultimately sought by the nature of the politics 
and by the ambition of the personal rule.  
On the other hand, the pattern of amity and enmity which places all the states 
in West Africa along the pendulum of friendship and hostility is directly intermingled 
with the issue of personalization of power. This concept pointed out the needs of the 
leader to gather support and alliance, in order to establish a firm legitimacy in the 
region. There are several conditions within which the decision on Taylor’s exit was 
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made. But the ultimate motive behind the safe haven arrangement was to halt the 
humanitarian disaster in Liberia. 
With regards to the approach of thesis, this discussion could not provide any 
deduction whether this arrangement might have a side political agenda; whether it is 
intended to seek a regional supremacy or the regime survival. On the other hand it 
was also difficult to verify the validity of the whole claim. Since the data for this 
thesis did not include interviews with the actors directly involved in the diplomacy, it 
is difficult to draw firm conclusion. 
Return to the Hypothesis 
The answers to the research questions seem to strengthen our working hypotheses. 
The hypothesis I put forward are (1) that Taylor’s exit is necessary to end the conflict 
in Liberia. (2) It was the humanitarian rationale which concerned the safe haven 
arrangement that facilitated Taylor’s exit from Liberia. (3) The main feature of 
Taylor’s exit rest on its ad hoc manner that bypassed the ECOWAS bureaucratic 
channel. It brought implication on the pragmatism of the West African political 
practices, and the importance of personal role, which is very much present in the 
African politics. (4) The distribution of power in West Africa shaped the unilateral 
dimension in the safe haven arrangement in West African diplomacy. 
Taylor’s departure provided new settlement in the Liberian conflict. It was the 
pre-requisite condition for transition and for lasting peace. Despite the controversy 
and criticism along with his departure, the ultimate goal underlying this decision was 
reached. The departure of Taylor from the domestic Liberian politics and the West 
African regional politics paved the way to the continuation of the peace process. As 
necessitated from the measure of conflict settlement, the arrangement brought finality 
to the conflict. The signing of the comprehensive peace agreement and the 
establishment of the transitional government led Liberia in the transitional period 
after the conflict.  
Theoretical and Methodological Implications 
By using a theoretical framework from Buzan and Wæver we have established the 
point of departure in discussing the research questions. The focus on the process of 
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diplomacy is thereby seen as the interactions among the states in West Africa. It leads 
us to the conception of the regional security which Buzan and Wæver treat 
extensively in the regional security complex theory.  
By revealing the pattern and logics as asserted by Buzan and Wæver we 
managed to outline the factors behind the diplomacy. However, their conception did 
not clearly specify the type and classification of states. With the kind of interaction 
concerned are mostly in political and military areas, what Buzan and Wæver saw in 
their conception of states are variations over the Weberian, legal-rational state. They 
therefore ignored that some states have distinct character that distinguish them from 
the Weberian state. 
As the states in Africa are very weakly institutionalized, we needed theoretical 
contributions that could account also for the contextual process and interaction. 
Chabal and Daloz have given a valuable addition to Buzan and Wæver, providing us 
with a theoretical frame for what we initially assume would be the case, and which 
later seems to be confirmed through the process of recorded and official statements 
along the series of the diplomacy in the Liberian conflict. 
Both approaches have given us understanding on how political process 
governed in West Africa are based on a pragmatic and personal relations, and why the 
process could happen as such. In one way the conception of Buzan and Waever fits 
with the conception from Chabal and Daloz. The factor of the distribution of power in 
the region, share the similar notion on ‘power’ with the factor the importance of 
vertical rule in African politics. Having the similar logic to reach the highest position 
in the hierarchy of power, both factors assert the needs of power that stem from the 
state and the head of state. At the same time, the pattern of amity and enmity that 
divide and differentiate the states into groups in the region, is a result from the 
personalized network that support and connect each actors in the region 
 The research questions and the eclectically chosen theoretical framework 
appear to be well suited to each other. The choice of the case in relation to the 
research questions and the theoretical framework has caused few problems during the 
analysis. By choosing to focus on the process within the diplomacy, we were given 
only the possibility to consider the short-term impact of the diplomacy. The objective 
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of the conflict settlement, as in the case of safe haven arrangement for Taylor, is to 
bring any armed conflicts into an end. Therefore, I argue that it is within a short 
period of time to assess and evaluate the application of this settlement. This is only 
one episode of the whole event in the Liberian conflict. However, the greater question 
which would be more relevant on a long term basis is in relation with the findings 
that have been assessed in the chapter two. It was the greater question on the 
reconstruction of the identity of Liberian polity in the post-conflict peace building 
and how the state acquired the legitimacy from its constituent. Assumingly this kind 
of reconstruction would provide a sustained peace in the country of conflicts. 
 Regarding the methodological design, an evident problem is the fact that the 
research questions ask how the West African diplomatic community has undergone 
the process of diplomacy that resulted in the safe haven arrangement. The best ideas I 
have presented here is by using secondary source on the recorded and official 
statements throughout the process. This can give hints and image about the 
diplomacy taking place, but they cannot give us the precise insights that we would 
have gained from interviews with key actors directly involved in the region. 
Furthermore, these interview may give additional information to draw a firmer 
conclusion as we believe that the decision making process was personalized and 
could have been to a greater extent informal thus undocumented. It is therefore hard 
to claim that what I have deduced for my data can accurately answer the research 
questions.  
 The data validity is weaker than one would have preferred due to this issue. 
The problem is acute where the information gained from the news excerpts and 
official statements only revealed what was allowed to be informed to public. A series 
of interview with the central decision makers would needed to get their perception of 
what happened, although it did not guarantee to give us the accurate information as 
well. However, the research questions and the methodological framework is probably 
the best and the closest we can get in this thesis, considering that the ideal solution is 
impossible to get for the time being.  
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Lesson learnt and Directions for Further Research 
To conclude the thesis I would like to return to the West African diplomacy in 
Liberian conflict. We have seen that the assessment of the political factors on the 
diplomacy was interpreted according to the theoretical framework that I have 
established. However, there are indications in the thesis suggesting the crucial point 
to get as close as possible to the factors behind the decision of Taylor’s exit. How 
should one proceed in order to draw firmer and a more empiric conclusion? 
 In order to get a good enough empirical basis a broad approach is necessary. 
With the new political situation in Liberia several possibilities present themselves. 
Qualitative interviews with a wide range of persons would be needed, including the 
diplomats in ECOWAS, as well as the bureaucrats in the administration of Nigeria or 
Ghana.  
With regards to the prospect of lasting peace in Liberia, the presence of the 
UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) which was deployed shortly after the 
comprehensive peace agreement was signed strengthened the peace process in 
Liberia. The fact that UNMIL was the largest UN peacekeeping mission that 
consisted of up to 15.000 military personnel showed the expectation that UNMIL 
would be able to contribute in a major way towards the resolution of conflict in 
Liberia. Later, the scheduled election took two rounds on the 11 October and 8 
November 2005. The final round resulted in the victory of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as 
the president of Liberia with 59.4 percent vote in defeating her competitor, George 
Weah with 40.6 percent vote. Up to this point, the situation after Taylor went to 
asylum showed the indications towards lasting peace in Liberia. By not taking part in 
the diplomatic arrangement, it is likely that UNMIL will maintain a long term 
presence of Liberia. 
The most recent event marked another episode in the safe haven arrangement. 
Johnson Sirleaf, in March 2006, formally requested the Nigerian government to give 
up Taylor to the Sierra Leone Special Court. Subsequent to her request, pressure also 
came from the international community on Obasanjo. Despite the critical three days 
of Taylor’s escape, later he was taken into custody. Obasanjo decided the extradition 
of Taylor and transported him to Sierra Leone where he would face prosecution.  
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 These recent event drew a larger question on the puzzlement of the whole 
process bringing Taylor to exile dated back in August 2003. Regarding the fact that 
now he could no longer escape prosecution as he was promised for, a different 
conclusion and analysis might emerge here. Was this part of a long term plan or 
simply a shift in political agenda of the regional actors? Regardless the answers, this 
diplomatic settlement should later be renamed as the (un)secure safe haven option for 
any troubled big men in the region. The unsecured diplomatic arrangement poses 
another question whether the safe haven arrangement could be repeated or not. Was 
this a one-time scenario? Could it be applied in other different cases? What can be 
suggested is that the credibility of the safe haven option has been weakened by the 
case of Taylor. A different situation, setting, and conditionality might be warranted to 
orchestrate another kind of diplomatic arrangement should similar cases happen in the 
future. 
Another point of question also comes up with the question concerning the 
commitment from the international community, namely the US. It was the US that 
endorsed Obasanjo to harbor Taylor, and apparently now it was the one throwing the 
accusation on Obasanjo’s decision. Was this merely another shift in their policy 
agenda? The possible explanation could be found in the emerging political stability in 
Liberia after the 2005 election. Different approach and consideration from the US 
administration might come along with the new ruling administration in Liberia. 
However, the political shift and new policy orientation is likely to be found in this 
case. 
 Held together, the complete picture of Taylor’s exit since the beginning to the 
very end would hopefully reveal more of the political process in the region. 
Nevertheless, the ultimate objective that one struggled to achieve: the conflict 
settlement in Liberia, was fulfilled. It implies the importance of pragmatism and the 
regional consensus among the important players in the regional politics. A 
strengthening of the assumption from this thesis in a new and more thorough project 
would have bearings on how we understand the regional dynamics of the security 
complex. In the prospect of such findings, a revision to the existing literature is 
warranted.   
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